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Fixing the Vaccine Act’s  
Structural Moral Hazard 
 
Brandon L. Boxler* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On March 26, 2003, Rolf and Angela Hazlehurst filed a claim to recover 
damages for injuries their son allegedly sustained after receiving a measles, 
mumps, and rubella (MMR) vaccine.1  Four years of discovery followed, 
during which counsel for the Hazlehursts requested documents and deposed 
officials from three federal agencies.2  They next sought to subpoena 
extensive product safety information from Merck & Company,3 and as the 
trial date approached, the attorneys even considered asking a court in the 
United Kingdom to unseal expert reports in a case involving similar claims 
of vaccine injury.4 
When the Hazlehurst case finally reached trial in October 2007,5 the 
record contained 1,085 medical articles and 50 expert reports.6  Seven 
experts testified for the Hazlehursts, with specialties ranging from 
toxicology to gastroenterology.7  The defense responded by calling fourteen 
of its own experts, including four immunologists, two child psychiatrists, 
 
*  Brandon L. Boxler is a law clerk to the Honorable Ed Carnes, U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit.  He received a B.A. (magna cum laude) from the University of Richmond and a 
J.D. (order of the coif) from William & Mary School of Law.  The author thanks Professor Rebecca 
Green for her insightful comments and feedback on an early draft of this article, Jill for her endless 
support, and the staff of the Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal for their hard work 
preparing this piece for publication. 
 1. Hazlehurst v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 03-654V, 2009 U.S. Claims LEXIS 
183, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Feb. 12, 2009). 
 2. Id. at *8-9.  A group of attorneys known as the Petitioners’ Steering Committee 
represented the Hazlehursts and coordinated proceedings for thousands of cases alleging vaccine-
related autistic disorders.  Id. at *7. 
 3. Id. at *9-10.  The discovery request sought “any research, survey, study, test or other 
investigation, whether published or not, that was not conducted by Merck . . . but that Merck was 
aware of, regarding the neurological and neurodevelopment human . . . health effects of the MMR 
[vaccine].”  Id. at *10 n.9. 
 4. Id. at *308. 
 5. Id. at *14. 
 6. Id. at *18. 
 7. Id. at *23. 
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and an infectious disease specialist.8  It took the presiding judicial officer 
sixteen months to weigh all of the evidence, and in February 2009, she 
issued a two-hundred page decision denying compensation.9  The 
Hazlehursts then continued to pursue their case on appeal, asking two 
separate courts to reverse the adverse decision.10  Only after losing both 
appeals did they finally give up.11 
In many ways, the Hazlehurst case moved through the legal system like 
a typical complex products liability lawsuit—the plaintiffs engaged in an 
adversarial process over the course of several years that involved numerous 
depositions, hundreds of documents, and dozens of experts.12  The 
Hazlehursts, however, did not file a products liability lawsuit.13  Nor were 
they litigating in federal district court.14 
The Hazlehursts filed their claim for damages in the Vaccine Injury 
Compensation Program (Vaccine Program or Program),15 a supposedly 
streamlined, nonadversarial alternative dispute resolution scheme that 
compensates those injured by government-recommended vaccines.16  
Congress designed the Program as an informal adjudicative process that 
would “work faster and with greater ease than the civil tort system.”17  But 
as the Hazlehurst case demonstrates, the Program does not always achieve 
those ideals.18  Claims filed in the Program often take several years to 
resolve, cost tens of thousands of dollars to pursue, and eventually percolate 
to traditional federal courts.19  The Program is failing to accomplish its 
purpose. 
This Article examines why proceedings in the Vaccine Program are 
mimicking the adversarial nature of traditional tort litigation.  Part I reviews 
the socio-legal environment that prompted Congress to create the Program.  
Part II outlines the basic structure of the Program and highlights many of its 
alternative features.  Part III then discusses a flaw in the statute creating the 
Program that incentivizes claimants to adopt litigious and adversarial 
postures—namely, that claimants have no reason to stop fighting their cases 
 
 8. Id. at *34-35. 
 9. Id. at *543. 
 10. See Hazlehurst v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 604 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 
Hazlehurst v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 88 Fed. Cl. 473 (2009). 
 11. Hazlehurst, 604 F.3d at 1354. 
 12. See id. at 1343; Hazlehurst, 88 Fed. Cl. 473; Hazlehurst, 2009 U.S. Claims LEXIS 183. 
 13. Hazlehurst, 2009 U.S. Claims LEXIS 183, at *2. 
 14. Id. 
 15. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-10 (2006). 
 16. See infra Part II. 
 17. Shalala v. Whitecotton, 514 U.S. 268, 269 (1995). 
 18. Hazlehurst v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 604 F.3d 1343, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 19. See infra Part IV. 
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because all costs that they incur while appealing an adverse decision are 
reimbursable regardless of the outcome of the appeal.  Part IV provides both 
empirical and anecdotal evidence to illustrate why this “free appeals” design 
flaw is a type of structural moral hazard that has permitted the Program to 
devolve into a litigious adjudicatory process.  Finally, Part V proposes 
statutory amendments and other solutions that can restructure the Program 
into the streamlined, efficient alternative forum for dispute resolution that 
Congress intended, and it responds to potential criticisms of the proposed 
solutions. 
II. THE 1980S VACCINE LIABILITY CRISIS 
A. Benefits and Risks of Vaccines 
Vaccination against infectious diseases “has been one of the most 
spectacularly effective public health initiatives this country has ever 
undertaken.”20  A series of routine injections now prevents illnesses that 
once injured or killed thousands of children each year.21  Before creation of 
the measles immunization program in 1963, 3 to 4 million people suffered 
from measles each year in the United States;22 by 2002, only 44 cases were 
reported.23  Deaths caused by tetanus have also rapidly declined, falling by 
99% since a vaccine against the toxin gained licensure in the 1940s.24  Other 
immunization achievements include the global eradication of small pox in 
197925 and the elimination of poliomyelitis from all but a few countries.26 
 
 20. H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 4 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6345; see also 
Fangjun Zhou, Economic Evaluation of the 7-Vaccine Routine Childhood Immunization Schedule in 
the United States, 2001, 159 ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 1136, 1136 (2005) 
(“Vaccines are one of the greatest achievements of biomedical science and public health and 
represent one of the most effective tools for the prevention of diseases.”). 
 21. Zhou, supra note 20, at 1140. 
 22. H. Cody Meissner, Peter M. Strebel & Walter A. Orenstein, Measles Vaccines and the 
Potential for Worldwide Eradication of Measles, 114 PEDIATRICS 1065, 1065 (2004). 
 23. Id. at 1066.  The World Health Organization recently predicted that effective international 
vaccine programs could wholly eradicate measles by 2020.  Press Release, World Health Org., 
Experts Assessing Measles Eradication Feasibility (July 28, 2010), available at 
http://new.paho.org/hq/index.php?option=com_content&task= view&id=3282&Itemid=1926. 
 24. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Tetanus Surveillance—United States, 2001-2008, 
60 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 365, 365 (2011). 
      25.  Smallpox, World Health Org. (2001),  
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/smallpox/en/. 
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In addition to their enormous public health benefits, vaccines are also 
“one of the most . . . cost-effective prevention measures available.”27  By 
proactively averting—instead of responsively treating—contagious illnesses, 
vaccines substantially reduce medical costs.28  The United States, for 
example, spent $84 million between 1967 and 1977 to eradicate smallpox.29  
That investment now saves $150 million per year in domestic control 
measures.30 
Immunization, however, “is not always without risk.”31  Many vaccines 
contain attenuated viruses, chemical preservatives, and adjuvants32 that can 
cause severe adverse reactions in “a small but significant number” of 
people.33  Those risks cannot be entirely eliminated even if the vaccine is 
perfectly manufactured and administered.34 
The discrete individual risks of vaccination are worth the overall 
societal reward that comes with a comprehensive immunization program.  
Although vaccines inevitably harm some people each year, widespread 
immunization saves many more people—including the most vulnerable 
among us—from acquiring potentially fatal illnesses.35  For that reason, all 
 
 26. Philippe Duclos et al., Global Immunization: Status, Progress, Challenges and Future, 9 
(Supp. 1) BMC INT’L HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 1, 2 (2009); see also Kimberly J. Garde, Note, This Will 
Only Hurt For . . . Ever: Compulsory Vaccine Laws, Injured Children, and No Redress, 3 PHOENIX 
L. REV. 509, 519-21 (2010) (listing examples of how mass-vaccination efforts have reduced the 
occurrence rates of communicable diseases). 
 27. Walter A. Orenstein et al., Financing Immunization of Adults in the United States, 82 
CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 764, 764 (2007). 
 28. See id. 
 29. Chester A. Robinson & Stephen J. Sepe, Immunization Policies for the 1990s and Beyond, 
in SUPPLYING VACCINES: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CRITICAL ISSUES 29, 32 (Mark Pauly, 
Chester A. Robinson, Stephen J. Sepe, Merrile Sing & Mary Kaye Willian eds., 1996). 
 30. Id.  Another study found that routine childhood immunization saves society over $40 
billion for each annual birth cohort.  Zhou, supra note 20, at 1141; cf. Press Release, Ctrs. for 
Disease Control & Prevention, Most U.S. Parents Are Vaccinating According to New CDC Survey 
Vaccine Coverage Rates for Children Remain High (Sept. 4, 2008), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/media/pressrel/2008/r080904.htm (“[D]uring a given year . . . [v]accination 
results in a total savings of $43.3 billion, including $9.9 billion in direct medical costs.”). 
 31. INST. OF MED., ADVERSE EFFECTS OF PERTUSSIS AND RUBELLA VACCINES 1 (Christopher 
P. Howson, Cynthia J. Howe & Harvey V. Fineberg eds., 1991). 
 32. See generally Paul A. Offit & Rita K. Jew, Addressing Parents’ Concerns: Do Vaccines 
Contain Harmful Preservatives, Adjuvants, Additives, or Residuals?, 112 PEDIATRICS 1394 (2003) 
(reviewing data on the chemical composition of vaccines). 
 33. H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 4 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6345. 
 34. Possible Side-Effects from Vaccines, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/vac-gen/side-effects.htm (last modified Feb. 2, 2012) (“Any vaccine 
can cause side effects.  For the most part these are minor (for example, a sore arm or low-grade 
fever) and go away within a few days.”). 
 35. A high rate of vaccination among the general population achieves herd immunity, “the 
resistance of a group to attack by a disease to which a large proportion of the members are immune, 
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fifty states have passed compulsory vaccination laws.36  Though 
controversial, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld these statutes against 
constitutional attack, reasoning that a tiny risk of harm to a subset of the 
population does not “strip the legislative department of its function to care 
for the public health and the public safety when endangered by epidemics of 
disease.”37  In other words, mandatory vaccination laws create a social 
contract:38 to enjoy the public health benefits of widespread disease 
prevention, individuals must bear the small burden of enduring the risk of 
vaccination.39 
B. A Growing Public Health Emergency 
The inherent risks of mass inoculation present the difficult question of 
who should bear the costs of compensating rare and unavoidable adverse 
reactions.  If most vaccine injuries occur through no fault of manufacturers, 
it seems unfair to burden them with liability.  But it also seems unfair not to 
give injured persons a viable legal remedy, especially if the government 
requires them to be vaccinated. 
 
thus lessening the likelihood of a patient with a disease coming into contact with a susceptible 
individual.”  John P. Fox et al., Herd Immunity: Basic Concept and Relevance to Public Health 
Immunization Practices, 94 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 179, 180 (1971) (quoting DORLAND’S 
ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY (W.B. Saunders Co. 1965)); see also M. Brisson & W.J. 
Edmunds, Economic Evaluation of Vaccination Program: The Impact of Herd-Immunity, 23 MED. 
DECISION MAKING 76, 76 (2003) (stating that mass immunization “not only reduces the incidence of 
disease in those immunized but also indirectly protects nonvaccinated susceptibles against 
infection”); Guilherme Gonҫalves, Herd Immunity: Recent Uses in Vaccine Assessment, 7 EXPERT 
REVIEWS 1493, 1493 (2008) (describing herd immunity as a process by which “[h]uman 
communities defend themselves against specific infectious agents in a way that extends beyond the 
simple sum of the immune status of its individuals”).  See generally Paul Fine, Ken Earnes & David 
L. Heymann, “Herd Immunity”: A Rough Guide, 51 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 911 (2011). 
 36. See Garde, supra note 26, at 555 app.A (collecting state mandatory vaccination laws). 
 37. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 37 (1905); cf. Mary Beth Neraas, Comment, The 
National Vaccine Injury Act of 1986: A Solution to the Vaccine Liability Crisis?, 63 WASH. L. REV. 
149, 150-51 (1988) (noting that “severe reactions” are “an unavoidable cost of mass inoculation . . . 
[but] the consensus of health and medical experts is that children should continue to be 
immunized”). 
 38. Edward P. Richards, III, Evolving Viruses and Stagnant Public Health Policies: Flu, Fear, 
and Free Riders, 37 A.B.A. J. LITIG. 42, 44 (2010). 
 39. Id. 
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Before 1986, those harmed by vaccines attempted to gain compensation 
in the courts, the best available legal forum at the time.40  As the number of 
government-recommended vaccines increased in the 1970s and 1980s, so 
too did the number of design defect, manufacturer defect, and other product 
liability lawsuits against pharmaceutical companies.41  The number of suits 
increased from approximately 24 in 1980 to nearly 150 in 1985,42 exposing 
“a small number of manufacturers to high litigation costs and enormous 
potential liabilities.”43 
In response to the rising costs of defending against these claims, many 
pharmaceutical companies stopped or threatened to stop producing 
vaccines.44  By 1984, Lederle was the only commercial manufacturer of the 
 
 40. For an overview of the theories of recovery that plaintiffs injured by vaccines most 
frequently asserted in civil court, see generally Okianer Christian Dark, Is the National Childhood 
Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 the Solution for the DTP Controversy?, 19 U. TOL. L. REV. 799, 817-34 
(1988). 
 41. See generally id. 
 42. Neraas, supra note 37, at 151 & n.15; see also Merrile Sing & Mary Kaye Willian, 
Supplying Vaccines: An Overview of the Market and Regulatory Context, in SUPPLYING VACCINES: 
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CRITICAL ISSUES 45, 51-52 (Mark Pauly, Chester A. Robinson, 
Stephen J. Sepe, Merrile Sing & Mary Kaye Willian eds., 1996) (“The number of product-liability 
lawsuits filed against DTP vaccine manufacturers began to increase in 1972 (17 DTP lawsuits), and 
peaked in 1985 and 1986 at 219 and 255 lawsuits, respectively . . . .  As the number of lawsuits filed 
against DTP vaccine manufacturers began to increase, DTP prices increased and the number of 
domestic DTP manufacturers decreased.”). 
 43. Neraas, supra note 37, at 151; see also Derry Ridgway, No-Fault Vaccine Insurance: 
Lessons from the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 
59, 60-62 (1999) (noting that vaccine manufacturers were exposed to $3.5 billion in potential 
liability between 1980 and 1986).  The Supreme Court recently detailed one theory of why lawsuits 
against manufacturers increased in the 1970s and 1980s: “[V]accines became, one might say, victims 
of their own success.  They had been so effective in preventing infectious diseases that the public 
became much less alarmed at the threat of those diseases, and much more concerned with the risk of 
injury from the vaccines themselves.”  Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 131 S. Ct. 1068, 1072 (2011).  In 
other words, the American public became complacent with the successfulness of vaccines, which 
made “it easier to forget the value of vaccines and to focus on their potential risks.”  Vaccines—
Finding the Balance Between Public Safety and Personal Choice: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on 
Gov’t Reform, 106th Cong. 14 (1999) (statement of Rep. Henry A. Waxman, Member, H. Comm. on 
Gov’t Reform); see also Joanna B. Apolinsky & Jeffrey A. Van  Detta, Rethinking Liability for 
Vaccine Injury, 19 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 537, 550 (2010) (“[A]s the occurrence of many 
historically common and very serious childhood diseases had seemingly been all but eradicated, 
many people became less concerned with these diseases themselves and more concerned with the 
risk of potential side effects from the vaccinations.”); E.J. Gangarosa et al., Impact of Anti-Vaccine 
Movements on Pertussis Control: The Untold Story, 351 LANCET 356, 360 (1998) (“[S]uccessful 
disease-control encourages complacency . . . .”). 
 44. Charles F. Hagan, Vaccine Compensation Schemes, 45 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 477, 479 
(1990); see also INST. OF MED., VACCINE SUPPLY AND INNOVATION 27-28 (1985); Sara Wexler, 
Recent Case, Bruesewitz v. Wyeth: The “Unavoidable Vaccine Problem”, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & 
PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 93, 98 (2011) (“In the ten years prior to [1986], the number of vaccine 
manufacturers shrank from twenty-six to just four.”). 
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diphtheria, tetanus, and pertussis (DTP) vaccine, and “its potential liability 
was over 200 times greater than its annual sales.”45  To reduce that exposure, 
the few manufacturers remaining in the market raised their prices to cover 
the increasing costs of insurance premiums and the projected costs of future 
litigation.46  Vaccine prices then “skyrocketed as much as 2,000 percent,” 
which threatened to make immunizations prohibitively expensive.47  The 
legal system’s failure to provide a suitable adjudicative process for 
compensating vaccine injuries had created a public health emergency. 
“Congress, faced with the prospect of an ever-shrinking vaccine supply 
and the potential devastation that could result from this shortage, got 
involved.”48  Recognizing that exposing vaccine manufacturers to continued 
tort liability would further drive up prices and force additional suppliers out 
of the market, Congress began searching for a legislative fix to the crisis.49  
It had to strike a delicate balance.50  On the one hand, Congress needed to 
reduce or eliminate manufacturer liability so that pharmaceutical companies 
would continue to produce immunizations; on the other, it needed to provide 
a legal forum to compensate those “deserving victims of vaccine-related 
injuries.”51  Congress attempted to strike this balance by passing the 
National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Act of 1986 (Vaccine Act 
or Act).52 
 
 45. Sing & Willian, supra note 42, at 52. 
 46. Id. 
 47. H.R. REP. NO. 101-247, at 509 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1906, 2235; see 
also Randall B. Keiser, Deja Vu All Over Again? The National Childhood Vaccine Injury 
Compensation Act of 1986, 47 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 15, 16 (1992) (“In 1980, a single dose of the 
measles, mumps, and rubella (MMR) vaccine cost $2.71 under a federal contract.  In 1986, the same 
dosage cost the federal government $8.47.”). 
 48. Elizabeth C. Scott, The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act Turns Fifteen, 56 FOOD & 
DRUG L.J. 351, 354 (2001); see also Keiser, supra note 47, at 16 (“Faced with a decreasing supply 
of vaccine products, as well as a corresponding increase in their price, the federal government acted 
to try to rectify the crisis situation.”). 
 49. O’Connell v. Shalala, 79 F.3d 170, 173 (1st Cir. 1996) (citations omitted); see also 
Richards, supra note 38, at 47. 
 50. For a discussion of the public policy challenges of “ensuring a continuous supply of safe 
and effective vaccines at prices that do not increase rapidly in real terms,” see Sing & Willian, supra 
note 42, at 45-49. 
 51. O’Connell, 79 F.3d at 173 (citations omitted). 
 52. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to -34 (2006); see also Schafer ex rel. Schafer v. Am. Cyanamid 
Co., 20 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1994) (Breyer, J.) (“Congress passed the law after hearing testimony (1) 
describing the critical need for vaccines to protect children from disease, (2) pointing out that 
vaccines inevitably harm a very small number of the many millions of people who are vaccinated, 
7
Boxler: Fixing the Vaccine Act's Structural Moral Hazard
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2013
 8 
III. THE VACCINE ACT 
The Vaccine Act is a legislative tort shield that prevents those who 
believe they were injured by specified immunizations from suing the 
administrator or manufacturer without first filing a petition for compensation 
in the Vaccine Program.53  All Program claims must be filed in the U.S. 
Court of Federal Claims with the Secretary of Health and Human Services 
(Secretary) listed as the named defendant.54  Attorneys from the Department 
of Justice represent the Secretary in these proceedings.55 
Once a petition for compensation is filed, decision makers called 
“special masters” determine whether to award compensation and, if so, how 
much.56  If claimants are dissatisfied with the special master’s resolution of 
their claim, they may reject the judgment and file a traditional civil action,57 
with some limitations.58  All awarded compensation is paid from a trust that 
is funded by an excise tax levied against each dose of certain vaccines.59  
The tax is justified by the theory that all children benefit from federally 
 
and (3) expressing dissatisfaction with traditional tort law as a way of compensating those few 
victims.”). 
 53. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(a)(2)(A) (“No person may bring a civil action for damages in an 
amount greater than $1,000 or in an unspecified amount against a vaccine administrator or 
manufacturer in a State or Federal court for damages arising from a vaccine-related injury or death 
associated with the administration of a vaccine . . . .”); see also Sing &Willian, supra note 42, at 52 
(“No vaccine manufacturer, physician, or health facility can be designated a defendant.”).  For an 
overview of the Vaccine Act’s preemption provisions, see Nitin Shah, Note, When Injury Is 
Unavoidable: The Vaccine Act’s Limited Preemption of Design Defect Claims, 96 VA. L. REV. 199, 
202-08 (2010). 
 54. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(a)(1). 
 55. MOLLY T. JOHNSON, CAROL E. DREW & DEAN P. MILETICH, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., USE OF 
EXPERT TESTIMONY, SPECIALIZED DECISION MAKERS, AND CASE-MANAGEMENT INNOVATIONS IN 
THE NATIONAL VACCINE INJURY COMPENSATION PROGRAM 4, 12 (1998). 
 56. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(d)(3). 
 57. Id. 
 58. See, e.g., id. § 300aa-22(b)(1) (“No vaccine manufacturer shall be liable in a civil action 
for damages arising from a vaccine-related injury or death . . . if the injury or death resulted from 
side effects that were unavoidable even though the vaccine was properly prepared and was 
accompanied by proper directions and warnings.”); id. § 300aa-22(b)(2) (creating a presumption that 
vaccines are accompanied by proper directions and warnings, and setting a “clear and convincing 
evidence” burden of proof for establishing lack of compliance). 
 59. See id. § 300aa-15(i)(2); see also 26 U.S.C. § 9510 (2006) (establishing the “Vaccine 
Injury Compensation Trust Fund”); id. § 4131(d) (imposing a “75 cents per dose” tax on certain 
vaccines to fund the trust).  Special masters may compensate claimants for a variety of expenses, 
including costs for “rehabilitation, developmental evaluation, special education, vocational training 
and placement, case management services, counseling, emotional or behavioral therapy, residential 
and custodial care service expenses, special equipment, related travel expenses, and facilities 
determined to be reasonably necessary.”  42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(a). 
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compelled vaccination,60 so “all people, through the federal government, 
hold the responsibility of providing a means of compensation for those 
children that [sic] are injured.”61 
A. “Alternative” Features of the Vaccine Program 
Congress intended the Program to compensate vaccine-injured persons 
“quickly, easily, and with certainty and generosity.”62  To accomplish those 
goals, the Act includes several streamlining measures, including requiring 
special masters to issue a ruling “not later than 240 days . . . after the date 
the petition was filed.”63  If the special master denies compensation, 
claimants may file an appeal with an Article III judge at the U.S. Court of 
Federal Claims in a process that is also expedited: parties have 30 days to 
file a motion for review, the Secretary has 30 days to file a response, and the 
judge has 120 days to make a decision.64  Alternatively, instead of filing an 
appeal, a claimant may reject the special master’s judgment and file suit in 
state or federal court.65  The statute, however, strongly discourages claimants 
from filing a traditional civil suit by making it difficult for plaintiffs to 
prevail in tort actions against vaccine manufacturers.66 
The following discussion highlights three other streamlining features of 
the Act, all of which Congress included to make the Program a less 
adversarial, more efficient route to compensation than traditional civil 
litigation. 
 
 60. See Richards, supra note 38, at 48. 
 61. Hagan, supra note 44, at 480. 
 62. H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 3 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6344; see also 
H.R. REP. NO. 101-247, at 510 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1906, 2236 (stating that the 
Program was intended to be “a quick, flexible, and streamlined system”); Shalala v. Whitecotton, 
514 U.S. 268, 269 (1995) (stating that the Program was “designed to work faster and with greater 
ease than the civil tort system”); Katherine E. Strong, Note, Proving Causation Under the Vaccine 
Injury Act: A New Approach for a New Day, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 426, 441 (2007) (“Congress 
intended that the Program render quick, certain, and generous determinations to petitioners.”). 
 63. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(d)(3).  A special master may suspend this 240-day requirement up to 
180 days.  Id. § 300aa-12(d)(3)(C).  Thus, the Act theoretically limits the adjudicative process to 420 
days.  But cf. infra Part IV.B (discussing how long it actually takes to resolve cases filed in the 
Program). 
 64. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(e). 
 65. Id. § 300aa-21(a). 
 66. See, e.g., id. § 300aa-22(b)(2) (creating a presumption that the manufacturer exercised due 
care if it complied with federal regulations); id. § 300aa-22(c) (barring liability based on failure to 
warn); id. § 300aa-22(b)(1) (eliminating strict tort liability for unavoidable side effects). 
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1. A No-Fault Prima Facie Case 
The main way the Vaccine Act facilitates less adversarial case 
adjudication is by eliminating fault from the prima facie case.  Claimants 
need only prove they suffered a vaccine injury; no one inquires into whether 
the manufacturer or any other party was negligent.67  By removing questions 
of fault from the claims-resolution process and easing claimants’ burden of 
proof, the Program simplifies what would otherwise be a complex, 
expensive, and lengthy discovery process.68  Congress wanted all parties in 
the Program to focus on efficiently compensating victims of vaccine injuries, 
not using litigation strategies to obscure relevant facts or defeat the opposing 
party at all costs.69  If a vaccine harmed someone, that person should receive 
compensation. 
2. The Vaccine Injury Table 
a. The Goal 
Although it simplified the relevant inquiry in Program cases to a 
relatively “straightforward proposition” by eliminating the element of fault 
from the prima facie case,70 Congress recognized that proving causation is 
still a heavy burden, especially because vaccines can trigger an array of 
complex physiological reactions that are “hitherto unproven in medicine.”71  
The Program thus further assists claimants with meeting their prima facie 
 
 67. Lowry ex rel. Lowry v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 189 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 
1999); see also 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22(b)-(c); Keiser, supra note 47, at 18; Robinson & Sepe, supra 
note 29, at 35; Scott, supra note 48, at 355. 
 68. O’Connell v. Shalala, 79 F.3d 170, 173 (1st Cir. 1996) (citations omitted); see also 
Stevens v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 99-594V, 2001 U.S. Claims LEXIS 67, at *20-21 
(Fed. Cl. Mar. 30, 2001), overruled on other grounds by Althen v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 
418 F.3d 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[T]he Vaccine Program was created to reduce tort litigation against 
manufacturers and administrators and to provide compensation to injured parties without requiring 
the difficult proofs of individual causation, negligence, and product defectiveness.  Hence, the 
Program was designed as ‘no fault’ . . . .”); Neraas, supra note 37, at 164-65 (“Because the only 
issues relevant to the compensation proceeding are whether the petitioner suffered a compensable 
injury and, if so, the extent of compensable damages, there is no need for inquiry into the issues that 
would be raised in a civil action.  Consequently, the entire proceeding can be expeditiously 
completed.”). 
 69. Cf. Betsy J. Grey, Homeland Security and Federal Relief: A Proposal for a Permanent 
Compensation System for Domestic Terrorist Victims, 9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 663, 699 
(2006) [hereinafter Grey, Permanent Compensation System] (noting that Congress designed the 
Program to be “a more efficient administration of damages than the traditional tort system”). 
 70. Zeagler v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 19 Cl. Ct. 151, 153 (1989). 
 71. Althen, 418 F.3d at 1280. 
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burden “to allow the finding of causation in a field bereft of complete and 
direct proof of how vaccines affect the human body.”72  Specifically, 
claimants may establish entitlement to compensation by proving that they 
suffered an injury listed on the “Vaccine Injury Table” (Table or Vaccine 
Table),73 a feature of the Program that one special master referred to as the 
“cornerstone” of the alternative dispute resolution scheme.74 
Petitioners who prove by a preponderance of the evidence that they 
suffered an injury listed on the Table within the requisite post-immunization 
timeframe are presumptively entitled to compensation;75 no showing of 
actual causation is required.76  The burden instead shifts to the government, 
which must prove that the claimant’s injury or death was “due to factors 
unrelated to the administration of the vaccine described in the petition.”77  If 
claimants cannot establish an “on-Table” injury, the case is not over; they 
may proceed “off-Table” and prove causation-in-fact by a preponderance of 
the evidence.78 
Congress intended that the Table’s presumptions would significantly 
streamline proceedings in the Program.79  The Federal Circuit described the 
on-Table route to compensation as “easy, as far as evidentiary proof goes . . . 
[because] the statute does the heavy lifting.”80  In other words, the Table 
 
 72. Id. 
 73. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-14(a) (2006); see also 42 C.F.R. § 100.3 (2010) (reporting the current 
version of the Table). 
 74. Stevens v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 99-594V, 2001 U.S. Claims LEXIS 67, 
at *21 (Fed. Cl. Mar. 30, 2001), overruled on other grounds by Althen, 418 F.3d at 1274. 
 75. Andreu v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 569 F.3d 1367, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[A] 
claimant who shows that he or she received a vaccination listed in the Vaccine Injury Table . . . and 
suffered an injury listed in the table within a prescribed period is afforded a presumption of 
causation.”); see also Gruber v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 61 Fed. Cl. 674, 678 (2004). 
 76. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 131 S. Ct. 1068, 1074 (2011). 
 77. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-13(a)(1)(B). 
 78. Id. § 300aa-13(a); see also H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 15-19 (1986), reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6356-60 (describing the function of the Table); Shyface ex rel. Shyface v. Sec’y 
of Human & Health Servs., 165 F.3d 1344, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (differentiating between “on-
Table” and “off-Table” claims).  To establish an off-Table claim, petitioners must establish “(1) a 
medical theory causally connecting the vaccination and the injury, (2) a logical sequence of cause 
and effect showing that the vaccination was the reason for the injury, and (3) a showing of a 
proximate temporal relationship between vaccination and injury.”  Althen v. Sec’y of Health & 
Human Servs., 418 F.3d 1274, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 79. Cf. Bruesewitz, 131 S. Ct. at 1073 (“Fast, informal adjudication is made possible by the 
Act’s Vaccine Injury Table . . . .”). 
 80. Hodges v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 9 F.3d 958, 961 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
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increases the probability that petitioners will receive compensation:81 
“[C]lose calls regarding causation are resolved in favor of injured 
claimants.”82  Here again, the statute was designed to alleviate 
contentiousness between the parties by encouraging the government to 
dispute only those cases that appear to be truly meritless, letting close calls 
advance immediately to a determination of damages.83  Recognizing these 
potential benefits of reducing litigiousness, the Government Accountability 
Office described the Table as the Program’s “most important feature.”84 
b. The Problem 
When Congress initially drafted the Table, it recognized that a sense of 
urgency to respond to the 1980s liability crisis caused it to rely on 
incomplete data when identifying injuries causally related to vaccines85—
that is, some injuries that should be on the Table were not included in the 
original version.  To remedy those oversights,86 Congress gave the Secretary 
power to modify the Table after a period for public comment.87  That 
authority is two-fold: the Secretary may (1) add new vaccines to the Table 
 
 81. Sing & Willian, supra note 42, at 53. 
 82. Althen, 418 F.3d at 1280; see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, VACCINE 
INJURY COMPENSATION: PROGRAM CHALLENGED TO SETTLE CLAIMS QUICKLY AND EASILY 19 
(1999) [hereinafter GAO, VACCINE INJURY COMPENSATION], available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/he00008.pdf (“In establishing the vaccine injury table as a desirable 
alternative for petitioners over the civil tort system, the Congress was initially willing to accept the 
risk that some compensation would be provided for injuries where the role of vaccines is 
uncertain.”); Compensating Vaccine Injuries: Are Reforms Needed?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy & Human Res. of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 106th Cong. 10 
(1999) [hereinafter Are Reforms Needed?] (statement of Rep. Henry A. Waxman, Member, H. 
Comm. on Gov’t Reform) (“There have been disputes about the science and epidemiology of 
vaccine injury.  We have always erred on the side of compensating children, if there was a scientific 
argument that injuries were vaccine related.  At least that was our intent—to err on the side of 
making sure that we compensated people who were injured.”). 
 83. Cf. Shifflett v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 30 Fed. Cl. 341, 345 (1994) (explaining 
that “Congress designed the Vaccine Table Injury to be overinclusive” so that vaccine-injured 
persons could receive compensation for their injuries “quickly, easily, and with certainty and 
generosity” (quotation marks omitted)). 
 84. GAO, VACCINE INJURY COMPENSATION, supra note 82, at 5. 
 85. See O’Connell v. Shalala, 79 F.3d 170, 173 (1st Cir. 1996) (stating that Congress’s 
delegation of power to the Secretary to amend the Table “probably reflected a congressional 
consensus that the first iteration of the Table was not perfect”). 
 86. Id. 
 87. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-14(c) (2006).  This authority to modify the Table does not violate the 
Presentment Clause of the U.S. Constitution because “the Vaccine Act does not authorize the 
Secretary to amend or repeal portions of the Act, but rather merely grants her the power to 
promulgate new regulations as contemplated in the Act.”  Terran v. Sec’y of Health & Human 
Servs., 195 F.3d 1302, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
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when the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention recommends them for 
routine administration to children, and (2) modify the list of injuries, 
illnesses, and conditions presumptively associated with each vaccine listed 
on the Table.88 
Delegating that administrative amendment power to the Secretary 
reflected a congressional consensus that the Table should be regularly and 
liberally amended to ensure claim adjudication in the Program remained 
streamlined and simple.89  That efficiency probably would not occur if 
Congress retained the amendment power for itself.  Maneuvering a 
technically complex bill through the legislative process is much more 
difficult than passing a regulation, and without a flexible administrative 
means to amend the Table in response to new medical discoveries, the 
“alternative” benefits of the Table would be gradually lost over time.90  So 
too would the Table’s function of “providing fair recovery for petitioners.”91  
Congress thus effectively charged the Secretary with maintaining the Table 
as a viable evidentiary tool that petitioners could use to establish their claims 
quickly and easily without resorting to the more difficult, timely, and costly 
process of establishing an off-Table claim. 
Since Congress created the Vaccine Program in 1986, however, the 
Secretary has rarely amended the Table.  And on those rare occasions when 
the Secretary does exercise the amendment authority, usually only new 
vaccines are added to the Table, not new injuries.  The Secretary has added 
six new vaccines to the Table since 1997, but has not included any 
corresponding presumptive injuries in those rulemakings.92 
 
 88. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-14(e)(2); see also H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 19 (1986), reprinted in 
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6360-61. 
 89. Cf. H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 20, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6361 (“As new vaccines are 
developed, licensed, or required by State law, the Committee intends that the Secretary make 
recommendations of modification as soon as possible.”); Betsy J. Grey, The Plague of Causation in 
the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 343, 346 (2011) [hereinafter 
Grey, Plague of Causation] (“Congress . . . expected that as evidence developed HHS would expand 
the Table to list additional combinations of injuries and vaccines, and the need for off-Table claims 
would be reduced or eliminated.”). 
 90. Elizabeth Breen, A One Shot Deal: The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, 41 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 309, 326 (1999). 
 91. Id. at 309. 
 92. See National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program: Addition of Trivalent Influenza 
Vaccines to the Vaccine Injury Table, 70 Fed. Reg. 19,092 (Apr. 12, 2005) (adding trivalent 
influenza vaccine to the Table); National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program: Revisions and 
Additions to the Vaccine Injury Table, 67 Fed. Reg. 48,558, 48,560 (July 25, 2002) (codified at 42 
C.F.R. pt. 100) (adding pneumococcal conjugate vaccine); National Vaccine Injury Compensation 
13
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The Secretary’s failure to add new injuries to the Table has caused an 
incredible shift in the type of claims filed in the Program.  In the 1980s and 
1990s, most claimants pursued on-Table theories of recovery, and case 
proceedings thus entailed straightforward evidentiary questions.93  Today, 
however, “the relevance of the Vaccine Injury Table has greatly 
diminished.”94  One special master even postulated that the Secretary’s 
failure to add new injuries to the Table has “flip-flopped” the percentages of 
off-Table and on-Table claims: “[P]rior to the amendments 90% of cases 
were Table cases, while after the amendments 90% of cases [are] actual 
causation cases.”95  Most petitioners now pursue off-Table theories of 
recovery, which present complex questions of actual causation without the 
help of the Table’s streamlining presumptions.96 
The consequences of this “flip-flop” have been dramatic.  Because 
proving causation in off-Table cases is more difficult than in on-Table 
cases,97 more money and time is now required to resolve claims filed in the 
Program,98 which means that many of the alternative features of the Program 
have been diminished or lost.  As the former chief special master described: 
 
Program: Addition of Vaccines Against Rotavirus to the Program, 64 Fed. Reg. 40,517, 40,518 (July 
27, 1999) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 100) (adding rotavirus vaccine); National Vaccine Injury 
Compensation Program (VICP): Effective Date Provisions of Coverage of Certain Vaccines to the 
Vaccine Injury Table, 63 Fed. Reg. 25,777 , 25,778 (May 11, 1998) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 60) 
(adding hepatitis B, Hib, and varicella vaccines).  The last time the Secretary added injuries to the 
Table was 1997.  National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program: Revisions and Additions to the 
Vaccine Injury Table—II, 62 Fed. Reg. 7685 (Feb. 20, 1997) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 100). 
 93. See Stevens v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 99-594V, 2001 U.S. Claims LEXIS 
67, at *23-25, *21 n.10 (Fed. Cl. Mar. 30, 2001), overruled on other grounds by Althen v. Sec’y of 
Health & Human Servs., 418 F.3d 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (stating that, before 1995, most claims filed 
in the Program were Table cases, which the special masters decided “relatively quickly” because 
“the Table foster[s] limited factual issues and medical testimony and rather speedy decisions”). 
 94. Id. at *21 n.10. 
 95. Id. at *25 (“[P]ractice has shown that virtually all of the cases proceed as causation-in-fact 
disputes.”). 
 96. As one example of how complex an off-Table claim may be, consider Hargrove v. 
Secretary of Health & Human Services, No. 05-0694V, 2009 U.S. Claims LEXIS 171 (Fed. Cl. Apr. 
14, 2009).  There, the claimant’s theory of causation was that a tetanus vaccine triggered an 
“anamnestic reaction” through a process called “molecular mimicry,” during which “an invading 
epitope cross-reacts with a self-protein.”  Id. at *20-21 (quoting the claimant’s expert witness). 
 97. See Grey, Permanent Compensation System, supra note 69, at 704 (stating that proving 
causation in the Program is “not a difficult problem, except in ‘off-Table’ cases”); see also GAO, 
VACCINE INJURY COMPENSATION, supra note 82, at 14 (“[P]etitioners with injuries not listed on the 
injury table historically have had a lower probability of being compensated than those with injuries 
that were listed.”); Lainie Rutkow et al., Balancing Consumer and Industry Interests in Public 
Health: The National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program and Its Influence During the Last Two 
Decades, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 681, 720 (2007) (noting that those claimants alleging on-Table 
injuries are nearly three times as likely to succeed as those alleging off-Table injuries). 
 98. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text; infra notes 218-22 and accompanying text. 
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[L]itigating Table cases has met Congress’s programmatic desire; that is, the special 
masters handle the cases relatively quickly and render decisions with certainty.  This is 
mostly because the straightforward requirements of the Table foster limited factual issues 
and medical testimony and rather speedy decisions.  Unfortunately, litigating actual 
causation cases clearly fails in this regard. . . .  The cases take longer to prepare, longer to 
present, and longer to decide.  Even though the same vaccines and injuries are 
represented in the cases, clear answers have proven elusive . . . .  In short, litigating 
causation cases has proven the antithesis of Congress’s desire for the Program.  Instead of 
speed, certainty, and fairness, costly lengthy case presentations, inconsistent outcomes, 
and disparate treatment of similarly-situated litigants has resulted.99 
In sum, by adding new vaccines to the Table without adding new 
injuries that enjoy a presumption of causation, nearly all petitioners now 
pursue their claims on a causation-in-fact basis.  The result of that 
transformation has been “full blown litigation” in the Vaccine Program.100  
“Clearly, that is not what Congress intended when it designed the Program 
as an alternative to tort litigation.”101 
3. Special Masters 
A final streamlining characteristic of the Vaccine Program is the Office 
of Special Masters.102  Judges of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims appoint 
up to eight special masters to four-year terms.103  The special masters serve 
as the initial decision makers for all petitions filed in the Program, 
determining whether to compensate a claim and, if so, setting the amount of 
the award.104 
Because their dockets consist exclusively of Program petitions, special 
masters develop expertise with the law, science, and medicine surrounding 
vaccine-injury claims.  Special masters are much more than ordinary fact 
finders or generalist trial judges; they are judicial specialists who have the 
“unique ability . . . to adjudge cases in the light of their own acquired 
specialized knowledge and expertise.”105  And because of their accumulated 
 
 99. Stevens, 2001 U.S. Claims LEXIS 67, at *23-24. 
 100. Id. at *25. 
 101. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 102. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(c)(1) (2006). 
 103. Id. § 300aa-12(a), (c). 
 104. Id. § 300aa-12(d)(3); see also supra text accompanying note 49. 
 105. Sword ex rel. Sword v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl. 183, 188 (1999); see also Hodges ex rel. 
Hodges v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 9 F.3d 958, 961 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (describing the special 
masters as a “group of specialists”); JOHNSON, DREW & MILETICH, supra note 55, at 41 (noting that 
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expertise, special masters are able to decide cases more expeditiously, fairly, 
and “correctly,” which ultimately improves the predictability of Vaccine Act 
case law and enhances claimant satisfaction with the adjudicative regime.106 
The expertise of special masters also helps to explain why Congress 
gave them so much control over the claims-resolution process107 and 
protected their decisions with the highly deferential “abuse of discretion” 
standard of review.108  The Act even permits special masters to “fit the 
forum to the fuss”109 by promulgating their own rules of evidence and 
procedure.110  Congress constrained the creation of those rules by stating 
only that they should “provide for a less-adversarial, expeditious, and 
informal proceeding for the resolution of petitions,” and “include flexible 
and informal standards of admissibility of evidence.”111 
Due in large part to their ability to control proceedings in the Program, 
special masters “retain[ ] considerable discretion in almost every element of 
the Act’s enforcement.”112  They can limit discovery, require testimony, and 
 
special masters “develop extensive familiarity with the scientific and medical issues that recur” in 
the Program, which helps them to “focus in on the critical issues in a case”). 
 106. Cf. Edna Sussman, Why Arbitrate? The Benefits and Savings, 81 N.Y. ST. B.A. J. 20, 20 
(2009) (noting that a primary benefit of arbitration is the ability to have a case resolved by 
“adjudicators with the expertise necessary to decide complex issues”).  But cf. JOHNSON, DREW & 
MILETICH, supra note 55, at 42-43 (reviewing some disadvantages of specialized adjudicators, 
including the decision makers “think[ing] they know more than they actually do”). 
 107. See Davis v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 07-451, 2010 U.S. Claims LEXIS 525, 
at *29 (Fed. Cl. July 12, 2010) (“It is axiomatic that special masters in vaccine cases have great 
leeway in building a record for decision.”); see also Grey, Permanent Compensation System, supra 
note 69, at 702 (“The special masters of the [Vaccine Program] hold immense power over the claims 
they administer.”). 
 108. See infra notes 123-29 and accompanying text. 
 109. Frank E.A. Sandler & Stephen B. Goldberg, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss: A User-
Friendly Guide to Selecting an ADR Procedure, 10 NEGOTIATION J. 49 (1994) (discussing 
considerations that should inform the creation of an ideal dispute resolution scheme for various types 
of conflicts). 
 110. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(d)(2) (2006); cf. Keiser, supra note 47, at 23 (“The Act gives the 
special master authority to require such evidence as necessary while conducting a proceeding.”).  
The Federal Rules of Evidence, therefore, do not apply to the Vaccine Program.  See, e.g., 
Hazlehurst ex rel. Hazlehurst v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 604 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 
2010); Andreu ex rel. Andreu v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 569 F.3d 1367, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 
2009); see also FED. CL. R. app.B, VACCINE R. 8(b) (“In receiving evidence, the special master will 
not be bound by common law or statutory rules of evidence . . . .”), available at 
http://www.uscfc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/court_info/rules_071309_v8.pdf. 
 111. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(d)(2). 
 112. Breen, supra note 90, at 328; see also Perreira v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 27 Fed. 
Cl. 29, 31 (1992) (“The . . . Office of Special Masters . . . [has] exceptional authority with 
considerable administrative independence in decisions on claims for compensation under the 
Program.”). 
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demand any other information necessary to make an informed decision.113  
In fact, special masters can render a decision—entered as a formal court 
judgment114—without even holding a hearing on the claim.115  Congress 
gave special masters that power because it was “concerned that the routine 
use of hearings” to gather evidence would “produce unnecessary 
formality . . . and may tend to create an adversary process rather than a no-
fault compensation proceeding.”116 
IV. PERVERSE INCENTIVES 
In many ways, the alternative features of the Vaccine Program give it 
the form of arbitration: Congress intended it to be a quick, efficient, and 
informal alternative to litigation where a third-party expert (the special 
master) issues a binding decision without the burden of having to comply 
with a variety of formal rules.117  But, much like modern-day arbitration,118 
the Program struggles to achieve those benefits of alternative dispute 
resolution because attorneys can still borrow strategies and tactics from 
litigation, obfuscating the potential for a streamlined, efficient, and 
nonadversarial claims-resolution process.  As discussed below, the Vaccine 
 
 113. Erica A. Little, Note, The Role of Special Masters in Off-Table Vaccination Compensation 
Cases: Assuring Flexibility over Certainty, 16 FED. CIR. B.J. 355, 362 (2007). 
 114. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(d)(3); see also H.R. REP. NO. 101-247, at 509 (1989), reprinted in 
1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1906, 2235. 
 115. The main drawback of vesting special masters with such incredible control and discretion 
over the claims-resolution process is that it leads to unpredictable and conflicting case law in the 
Vaccine Program, a problem that I have discussed elsewhere.  See Brandon L. Boxler, Note, What to 
Do with Daubert: How to Bring Standards of Reliable Scientific Evidence to the National Vaccine 
Injury Compensation Program, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1319, 1338-43 (2011). 
 116. H.R. REP. NO. 101-247, at 512-13, 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2238-39. 
 117. Sarah Rudolph Cole & Kristen M. Blankley, Arbitration, in THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION 318, 318 (Michael L. Moffitt & Robert C. Bordone eds., 2005) (defining arbitration as 
“a process by which a private third-party neutral renders a binding determination of an issue in 
dispute”); see also Christopher R. Drahozal & Quentin R. Wittrock, Is There a Flight from 
Arbitration?, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 71, 77-78 (2008) (noting that parties agree to arbitration because 
it “may resolve disputes more quickly and at lower cost than litigation” and “may result in better 
outcomes because the decisionmakers are experts”); L. Tyrone Holt, Whither Arbitration? What Can 
Be Done to Improve Arbitration and Keep Out Litigation’s Ill Effects, 7 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 
455, 463 (2009) (“Whenever a dispute requires technical knowledge, arbitration will always be 
superior to the courts . . . .”). 
 118. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The “New Litigation”, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 28 
(2010) (noting the modern trend toward “‘legalized’ arbitration,” which involves “contentious 
tactics” that create conflict instead of mutually beneficial communication). 
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Act does little to guard against this spillover from the traditional court 
system; in fact, its structure gives claimants and their attorneys an incentive 
to transform the Program into full-blown civil litigation. 
This section highlights a structural flaw in the design of the Vaccine Act 
that arises from the intersection of two features of the Program.  The first 
feature provides multiple layers of review of special master decisions, and 
the second reimburses all claimants for fees and costs they incur while 
prosecuting a claim that was filed in “good faith” with a “reasonable basis.”  
These two statutory provisions combine to create a system of adjudication 
that encourages litigious posturing, undermines the finality of special master 
decisions, and erodes the alternative nature of the Program. 
A. Several Layers of Appeal 
Although Congress intended that special master decisions would 
effectively end proceedings on a claim,119 the Vaccine Act provides for 
several levels of appeal.120  Special master decisions are initially reviewable 
at the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, then at the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit, and eventually at the U.S. Supreme Court.121  The 
Supreme Court has never expressly stated what standard of review it applies 
to Vaccine Act cases,122 but the statute states that the U.S. Court of Federal 
Claims may set aside special master decisions only if they are “arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with 
law,”123 and the Federal Circuit also applies that standard.124  Congress 
intended for the “highly deferential”125 abuse of discretion standard to make 
review of special master decisions an “extraordinary event.”126  By ensuring 
the rarity of reversal, the Act promotes finality and efficiency—two of the 
principal benefits of alternative dispute resolution processes.127 
 
 119. See infra text accompanying notes 130-32. 
 120. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(e) (2006). 
 121. Id.; see also JOHNSON, DREW & MILETICH, supra note 55, at 16-17 (discussing the process 
of appealing special master decisions). 
 122. The Supreme Court has decided only one case that originated from within the Vaccine 
Program, and it presented a pure question of law.  Shalala v. Whitecotton, 514 U.S. 268 (1995) 
(involving the procedure by which the Secretary may rebut a claimant’s prima facie case). 
 123. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(e)(2)(B); see also Little, supra note 113, at 363-64 (2007). 
 124. See, e.g., Munn v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 970 F.2d 863, 870 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 125. Hodges v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 9 F.3d 958, 961 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
 126. Piper v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 29 Fed. Cl. 628, 632 (1993). 
 127. See, e.g., Amy J. Schmitz, “Drive-Thru” Arbitration in the Digital Age: Empowering 
Consumers Through Binding ODR, 62 BAYLOR L. REV. 178, 205-06 (2010); Brian T. Burns, Note, 
Freedom, Finality, and Federal Preemption: Seeking Expanded Judicial Review of Arbitration 
Awards Under State Law After Hall Street, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1813, 1814 (2010) (noting 
“arbitration’s fundamental values of efficiency, finality, and autonomy”); cf. Westvaco Corp. v. 
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Indeed, because they recognize that special masters have unique 
expertise to weigh the medical evidence in vaccine-injury cases, appellate 
courts are especially hesitant to set aside special master decisions.  The 
Federal Circuit even declared that a special master’s assessments about 
witness credibility and the relative persuasiveness of competing medical 
theories are “virtually unchallengeable on appeal.”128  It reasoned that 
Congress did not want the court to “second guess the Special Masters [sic] 
fact-intensive conclusions,” so it uses a “uniquely deferential” standard of 
review.129  Such respect for special master expertise “effectively ensures that 
[their determinations] will not be overturned”130—a statement that has 
proven true in the case law.131  In Cucuras v. Secretary of Health & Human 
Services, for example, the special master held that the diphtheria, tetanus, 
and pertussis vaccine cannot cause chronic encephalopathies.132  A different 
case decided one year later by the same special master reached the exact 
opposite conclusion.133  The U.S. Court of Federal Claims affirmed both 
decisions on appeal.134 
Despite this deferential posture of review, which makes overturning 
special master decisions an incredibly difficult task, it is very common for 
 
United Paperworkers Int’l Union, 171 F.3d 971, 975 (4th Cir. 1999) (“Because judicial interference 
with an arbitrator’s interpretation threatens both the efficacy and finality of arbitration, judicial 
review of that interpretation is highly constrained.”). 
 128. Lampe v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 219 F.3d 1357, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2000) 
(emphasis added); see also Porter v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 663 F.3d 1242, 1249 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011) (“[A]s long as a special master’s finding of fact is based on evidence in the record that is 
not wholly implausible, we are compelled to uphold that finding as not being arbitrary or 
capricious.” (quotations and alterations omitted)); Cedillo v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 617 
F.3d 1328, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Our role is not to second guess the Special Master’s fact-
intensive conclusions, particularly in cases in which the medical evidence of causation is in dispute.” 
(quotations and citation omitted)); Hines v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 940 F.2d 1518, 1528 
(Fed. Cir. 1991) (“If the special master has considered the relevant evidence of record, drawn 
plausible inferences and articulated a rational basis for the decision, reversible error will be 
extremely difficult to demonstrate.”). 
 129. Hodges, 9 F.3d at 961. 
 130. Apolinsky & Van Detta, supra note 43, at 578; see also Hazlehurst ex rel. Hazlehurst v. 
Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 604 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Brittani Scott Miller, The 
National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program: The Unavailability of Experienced Attorneys 
Places Petitioners at an Institutional Disadvantage, 19 FED. CIR. B.J. 253, 261 (2009) (“[A] court 
cannot reverse a decision by the special master merely because the court would have reached a 
different conclusion than the special master based on the facts in the record.”). 
 131. See generally infra Appendix. 
 132. Cucuras v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 26 Cl. Ct. 537, 543 (1992). 
 133. Estep ex rel. Estep v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 28 Fed. Cl. 664, 668-69 (1993). 
 134. Id. at 669. 
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Vaccine Program claimants to appeal denials of compensation to the U.S. 
Court of Federal Claims and then appeal for a second time to the Federal 
Circuit.135  That seems counterintuitive.  It makes sense, however, when one 
considers another feature of the Program: claimants do not pay their own 
fees and costs even if they lose on appeal.  Claimants thus have little 
incentive to accept an adverse special master decision because they have a 
right to appeal their case for free—twice. 
B.  Reimbursable Attorneys’ Fees and Costs 
To ensure that all vaccine-injured persons have an opportunity to obtain 
financial assistance,136 and to complement the no-fault nature of the 
Program,137 section 15(e)(1) of the Vaccine Act provides that special masters 
may award attorneys’ fees and costs “incurred in any proceeding” on a 
petition for compensation.138  The statute expressly provides that these 
expenses are recoverable even if the special master “does not award 
compensation . . . if the special master or court determines that the petition 
was brought in good faith and there was a reasonable basis for the claim for 
which the petition was brought.”139 
These standards of “good faith” and “reasonable basis” theoretically 
limit the right of recovery, but that rarely occurs.  The “good faith” standard 
is subjective, and is thus a “very low” hurdle to satisfy.140  Claimants are 
 
 135. See infra notes 227-32 and accompanying text. 
 136. See Browning v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 02-929V, 2010 U.S. Claims 
LEXIS 761, at *16-17 (Fed. Cl. Sept. 27, 2010) (“In designing the Act, Congress sought to spare 
injured persons, who often have mounting health expenses, from delays, court payments, and the 
expense of attorneys’ fees.  To further that end, the Vaccine Act forbade an attorney from charging a 
petitioner a fee, and instead permitted the court to award reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs both to 
successful and unsuccessful petitioners.”); see also Doe v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 19 Cl. 
Ct. 439, 443-44 (1990) (explaining that section 15(e)(1) is consistent with the purpose of the 
Vaccine Act because “potential petitioners who seek compensation under the vaccine program, 
including those with limited resources, should be able to obtain representation”); GAO, VACCINE 
INJURY COMPENSATION, supra note 82, at 5. 
 137. Keiser, supra note 47, at 26. 
 138. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e)(1) (2006).  If the special master does not award fees and costs, 
“counsel are forbidden from soliciting or accepting any fee from the petitioner.”  Jessen v. Sec’y of 
Health & Human Servs., No. 94 1029V, 1997 U.S. Claims LEXIS 20, at *17 n.7 (Fed. Cl. Jan. 17, 
1997). 
 139. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e)(1)(B) (emphasis added); see also Saxton v. Sec’y of Health & 
Human Servs., 3 F.3d 1517, 1521 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“If the petition for compensation is denied, the 
special master may award reasonable fees and costs if the petition was brought in good faith and 
upon a reasonable basis.” (quotation and citation omitted)). 
 140. Holmes v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 08-185, 2011 U.S. Claims LEXIS 406, at 
*5 (Fed. Cl. Feb. 28, 2011); see also Hamrick v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 99-683V, 
2007 U.S. Claims LEXIS 415, *9 (Fed. Cl. Jan. 9, 2008); Turner v. Sec’y of Health & Human 
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also entitled to a presumption of good faith when they file a petition, and the 
government cannot overcome that presumption without “direct evidence of 
bad faith.”141  So any claimant who files a petition in the Program satisfies 
the “good faith” standard unless the government can show that the claimant 
knew the petition was meritless—that is, unless the government can show 
that the claimant knew a vaccine did not cause the alleged injuries.  That 
effectively means that anyone who believes they suffered a vaccine injury 
meets the good faith standard.  And that effectively means that anyone who 
files a claim in the Vaccine Program meets the standard.  And that 
effectively means there is no standard.  As one special master described: 
“The good faith requirement is an easy test to satisfy.  In this case, Petitioner 
believed that [her son] suffered a vaccine-injury, thereby satisfying the good 
faith requirement.”142  Special masters have even awarded claimants fees 
and costs in cases that are “a longshot attempt to recover under the vaccine 
program”143 or that contain no evidence of a causal connection between 
immunization and injury other than a mother’s affidavit.144 
The “reasonable basis” prong of section 15(e)(1), though an objective 
requirement,145 is just as easy to establish as the “good faith” prong.  
“Historically, special masters have been quite generous in finding a 
reasonable basis for petitioners.”146  Cases finding that a claimant did not 
have a reasonable basis to file a claim are extremely rare,147 and special 
 
Servs., No. 99-544V, 2007 U.S. Claims LEXIS 394, at *21 (Fed. Cl. Nov. 30, 2007) (“[T]he ‘good 
faith’ requirement of section 15(e)(1) is a subjective standard that focuses upon whether petitioner 
honestly believed he had a legitimate claim for compensation.”). 
 141. Grice v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 36 Fed. Cl. 114, 121 (1996). 
 142. Browning v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 07-453V, 2010 U.S. Claims LEXIS 
765, at *24 (Fed. Cl. Sept. 27, 2010) (emphasis added); see also Arbuthnott v. Sec’y of Health & 
Human Servs., No. 90-1739V, 1994 U.S. Claims LEXIS 9, at *3 (Fed. Cl. Jan. 7, 1994) (finding 
petitioner brought the claim in “good faith” because the special master had “no reason to doubt that 
petitioner honestly believed in the validity of her claim”). 
 143. Doe v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 19 Cl. Ct. 439, 443 (1990). 
 144. Lamar v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 99-584V, 2008 U.S. Claims LEXIS 442, 
at *11-12 (Fed. Cl. July 30, 2008). 
 145. Turner, 2007 U.S. Claims LEXIS 394, at *6. 
 146. Browning, 2010 U.S. Claims LEXIS 765, at *27 (quotation and citations omitted); see also 
Schueman v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 04-693V, 2010 U.S. Claims LEXIS 639, at *10 
(Fed. Cl. Aug. 11, 2010) (“Special masters have liberally interpreted the good faith and reasonable 
basis requirements.”). 
 147. Rydzewski v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 99-571V, 2008 U.S. Claims LEXIS 
30, at *23 (Fed. Cl. Jan. 29, 2008); see also Brown v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 99-
539V, 2005 U.S. Claims LEXIS 122, at *8 (Fed. Cl. Mar. 11, 2005) (“[V]ery few cases have been 
denied fees and costs based upon the reasonability standard.”). 
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masters admittedly construe section 15(e)(1) “liberally”148 to ensure that 
attorneys will eagerly represent claimants in the Program.149 
That “relaxed standard”150 for evaluating the reasonableness of bringing 
a claim has become synonymous with frivolity.151  In Rydzewski,152 for 
example, the special master found that a claimant lacked a reasonable basis 
for filing a petition because she had no reasonable basis for believing that 
she even received the purportedly harmful immunization.153  The claimant 
alleged that she slipped into a coma for two days after doctors injected her 
with “an experimental form of the hepatitis B vaccine that was being given 
to soldiers.”154  The special master, however, was “not aware of any 
experimental forms of the hepatitis B vaccine.”155  Nor did the hospital 
records show that the claimant was ever in a coma.156  Other than “her own 
questionable statements,” the petitioner presented no evidence to support a 
finding that she received the vaccination.157 
The Rydzewski standard for establishing “reasonableness” is so low that 
it is essentially identical to the burden of establishing that a claim falls 
within the subject matter jurisdiction of the Act.  Section (11)(b) lists 
requirements that determine whether someone may file a petition: 
[A]ny person who has sustained a vaccine-related injury, the legal representative of such 
person if such person is a minor or is disabled, or the legal representative of any person 
 
 148. Melbourne v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 99-694V, 2007 U.S. Claims LEXIS 
221, at *19 (Fed. Cl. June 22, 2007); cf. Grice v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 36 Fed. Cl. 114, 
121 (1996) (“[Claimants] are entitled to a presumption of good faith.”). 
 149. Hamrick v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 99-683V, 2007 U.S. Claims LEXIS 415, 
at *15-16 (Fed. Cl. Nov. 19, 2007) (describing why “[l]atitude in evaluating the reasonable basis for 
filing a petition comports with public policy” and is consistent with Congress’s goals for the 
Program); see also Jessen v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 94-1029V, 1997 U.S. Claims 
LEXIS 20, at *16 (Fed. Cl. Jan. 17, 1997) (“[I]f the special masters were to set too high a standard as 
to the reasonable basis issue, and too often deny fees awards on that basis, it surely would 
discourage some attorneys from even taking cases involving vaccine injuries in the first place, for it 
would face such counsel with the prospect of working through a Program proceeding and then 
possibly receiving no compensation whatever for that work.”). 
 150. Hamrick, 2007 U.S. Claims LEXIS 415, at *18. 
 151. E.g., Perreira v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 27 Fed. Cl. 29, 35 (1992) (citing to a 
discussion about “frivolous” cases from the Model Rules of Professional Conduct when explaining 
why a petitioner’s request for fees and costs was denied). 
 152. Rydzewski v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 99-571V, 2008 U.S. Claims LEXIS 
30 (Fed. Cl. Jan. 29, 2008). 
 153. Id. at *13. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at *11; cf. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(a) (2006) (“The special master or court may not 
[award compensation] based on the claims of a petitioner alone, unsubstantiated by medical records 
or by medical opinion.”). 
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who died as the result of the administration of a vaccine set forth in the Vaccine Injury 
Table, may, if the person meets the requirements of subsection (c)(1) of this section, file a 
petition for compensation under the [Act].158 
This language defines who may file a petition in the Program; therefore, 
those who do not meet the requirements of section 11(c)(1) may not (or 
cannot properly) file a claim.159  First among the section 11(c)(1) 
requirements is proof that the injured person “received a vaccine set forth in 
the Vaccine Injury Table.”160  When read in conjunction with section 11(b), 
this provision establishes an a fortiori jurisdictional requirement that an 
injured person prove receipt of a covered vaccine before filing a petition.161  
And the standard for meeting that jurisdictional requirement seems to be 
identical to the standard for filing a “reasonable basis” claim worthy of 
attorneys’ fees and costs.162 
The point is simply that the bar for obtaining attorneys’ fees pursuant to 
section 15(e)(1) is extremely low.  If special masters have jurisdiction over 
the claim, which is almost always the case,163 they award fees and costs 
 
 158. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added). 
 159. Cf. H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 13 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6354 
(stating that claimants must establish “eligibility” for compensation “before entering” the Vaccine 
Program). 
 160. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(c)(1)(A). 
 161. No Federal Circuit decision has expressly described the requirements of section 11(c)(1) as 
jurisdictional per se, but at least one lower court has treated section 11(c)(1) as a jurisdictional 
provision.  In McGowan v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 31 Fed. Cl. 734 (1994), a 
claimant appealed a special master’s decision dismissing her case for failing to return to the United 
States within six months after vaccination, as required by section 11(c)(1)(B)(i)(III).  The McGowan 
court described the issue before it as jurisdictional: “When dealing with issues of jurisdiction, as in 
this case, the statute must be construed strictly, as it is a limited waiver of sovereign immunity.”  
McGowan, 31 Fed. Cl. at 740; see also id. (“Only those petitioners who are eligible under the 
Vaccine Act can avail themselves of the remedial nature of the Vaccine Act.”) (emphasis added).  
Ultimately, the McGowan court held that the special master correctly dismissed the petition because 
the claimant did not return to the United States within the meaning of section 11(c)(1)(B)(i)(III), and 
thus “fail[ed] to meet the jurisdictional requirements of the Vaccine Act.”  Id. 
 162. Cf. Brice v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 358 F.3d 865, 868 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding 
that the court must have jurisdiction over a Vaccine Act claim in order to award attorneys’ fees and 
costs). 
 163. In Melbourne v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, No. 99-694V, 2007 U.S. Claims 
LEXIS 221, at *8 (Fed. Cl. June 22, 2007), the chief special master reasoned that a claimant need 
only allege that she “received a covered vaccine” to bring her case within the Vaccine Act’s 
jurisdiction.  With such a low standard, it is unsurprising that “[t]here are few established instances 
in which this court lacks jurisdiction over petitioner’s claim and thus, lacks jurisdiction to award 
attorneys’ fees and costs.”  Id. at *7. 
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unless the claim is “patently unreasonable,”164 brought in “bad faith,”165 or 
“where truly there existed no logical basis for the claim.”166  Some special 
masters even award fees when claimants do not file an immunization record 
to prove they received a covered vaccine.167  Those cases are particularly 
shocking considering the Act expressly provides that each petition “shall 
contain . . . vaccination records associated with the vaccine allegedly 
causing the injury.”168 
C. The Structural Problem 
Because the Vaccine Act’s generous fee shifting provision is not limited 
to proceedings conducted before special masters, claimants may recover fees 
and costs incurred while appealing their cases to the U.S. Court of Federal 
Claims, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court—even if they lose at 
each forum.169  That statutory structure creates perverse incentives.  
Claimants and their attorneys essentially have no reason to stop litigating 
their claims.  By appealing a case as far as possible, the attorney gets to bill 
more hours and make more money, the client gets extra free chances at 
winning the case and receiving compensation, and neither attorney nor 
client incurs any risk of loss or financial cost for doing so.  One could even 
argue that not appealing an adverse special master decision would constitute 
professional malpractice.170  If a disabled client gets another free chance to 
obtain thousands of dollars in compensation, the attorney should take it, 
especially if the government will pay all fees and costs for taking that 
chance, regardless of the outcome. 
 
 164. Perreira v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 27 Fed. Cl. 29, 33 (1992). 
 165. Grice v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 36 Fed. Cl. 114, 121 (1996); cf. Smith v. Sec’y 
of Health & Human Servs., No. 91-57V, 1992 U.S. Cl. Ct. LEXIS 400, at *6 (Cl. Ct. Aug. 13, 1992) 
(denying an award of fees and costs when the petitioner did not argue that the claim was filed in 
good faith). 
 166. Jessen v. Sec’y v. Health & Human Servs., No. 94-1029V, 1997 U.S. Claims LEXIS 20, at 
*17 (Fed. Cl. Jan. 17, 1997). 
 167. See, e.g., Melbourne, 2007 U.S. Claims LEXIS 221, at *9. 
 168. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(c) (2006).  But see Brown v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 
99-539V, 2005 U.S. Claims LEXIS 122, at *5-6 (Fed. Cl. Mar. 11, 2005) (finding no reasonable 
basis when the only documents supporting the petition were e-mails sent between the law firm and 
the claimant); Di Roma v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 90-3288V, 1993 U.S. Claims 
LEXIS 317, at *5 (Cl. Ct. Nov. 18, 1993) (denying a motion for attorneys’ fees and costs when 
“minimal investigation would have revealed the absence of any legal or medical support for 
petitioner’s claim”); Murphy v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 30 Fed. Cl. 60, 61 (1993) (finding 
no reasonable basis when the medical records directly contradicted statements in the petition). 
 169. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e)(1). 
 170. Provided, of course, that a nonfrivolous argument supports the appeal. 
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The Vaccine Act thus establishes a structural moral hazard.  “In the 
economics literature and in the law and policy debate that draws upon this 
literature, ‘moral hazard’ refers to the tendency for insurance against loss to 
reduce incentives to prevent or minimize the cost of loss.”171  Within the 
Vaccine Program, claimants have a type of insurance (free appeals) that 
reduces their incentives to minimize economic losses (the cost of litigating 
and pursuing an appeal).  Because the Act effectively eliminates the burdens 
of appealing a meritless case, it encourages claimants to continue litigating 
their claims, generating costs that they ultimately will not bear.172  The 
claimant decides how much risk to take while the government—via the 
Vaccine Trust Fund—bears the costs “if things go badly.”173  That situation 
stands in stark contrast to traditional civil litigation, where attorneys and 
clients carefully evaluate whether to appeal an unfavorable verdict because 
the client bears both the risks and costs of seeking review. 
Professor Michael LeRoy has argued that a similar moral hazard exists 
in certain employer liability arbitration agreements.174  Many of these 
agreements force employees to adjudicate their claims in binding 
arbitration175 yet also provide employers with the right to seek de novo 
judicial review of the arbitrator’s award.176  Thus, even if an arbitrator finds 
in favor of the employee, the employer still has a second chance to avoid 
“the financial consequences of its wrongdoing” because the agreement 
preserves access to the courts.177  As a result, the substitute forum provision 
 
 171. Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237, 238-39 (1996). 
 172. Cf. id. at 238 (“What moral hazard means is that, if you cushion the consequences of bad 
behavior, then you encourage that bad behavior.”). 
 173. PAUL KRUGMAN, THE RETURN OF DEPRESSION ECONOMICS AND THE CRISIS OF 2008, at 
63 (2009) (defining moral hazard to be when one person decides the amount of risk to take when 
another person bears all the costs of taking that risk). 
 174. Michael H. LeRoy, Do Courts Create Moral Hazard?: When Judges Nullify Employer 
Liability in Arbitrations, 93 MINN. L. REV. 998 (2009).  A compulsory arbitration agreement is a 
“binding agreement between an employer and an employee to arbitrate future employment disputes.”  
Marcela Noemi Siderman, Compulsory Arbitration Agreements Worth Saving: Reforming 
Arbitration to Accommodate Title VII Provisions, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1885, 1891 (2000). 
 175. Like the Vaccine Program, arbitration typically enjoys a more informal, flexible, and less-
adversarial dispute resolution process than traditional civil litigation.  See generally R. Wilson 
Freyermuth, Foreclosure by Arbitration?, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 459, 471-76 (2010) (describing the 
process characteristics of arbitration). 
 176. LeRoy, supra note 174, at 1008-09. 
 177. Id. at 1008. 
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in the employment contract is undermined and “employers have two 
separate adjudications to avoid liability.”178 
The “free appeals” structure of the Vaccine Program similarly 
undermines its usefulness as a substitute forum.  Congress intended the 
Program to be the forum to resolve claims of vaccine injury.  The entire 
point of establishing the Program was to remove such claims from the civil 
court system.179  But because claimants get a risk-free second—and third and 
fourth—chance to obtain compensation by appealing to traditional federal 
courts, the finality and effectiveness of the Program as a viable alternative 
legal forum is undermined. 
This erosion of finality is especially troublesome because it creates a 
two-tiered compensation scheme, making the Program a less efficient 
alternative to civil litigation, the exact opposite of what Congress 
intended.180  By encouraging claimants to appeal adverse judgments, special 
master decisions become merely precatory, not final, because a judge on the 
U.S. Court of Federal Claims or the Federal Circuit will ultimately resolve 
the case.  In other words, the alternative dispute resolution process 
conducted before special masters in the Program is a mere prelude to the 
“real” dispute resolution process that will be conducted before federal judges 
in the appellate courts.  The Program, therefore, becomes a fourth step in 
“the usual three instances of litigation in the ordinary courts.”181 
Congress did not foresee these structural defects when it passed the Act 
in 1986.  Back then, it expected that review of special master decisions 
would be rare and that the costs of pursuing a claim would be low.182  
Adding section 15(e)(1) to the statute was thus a relatively benign tradeoff in 
exchange for encouraging attorneys to help injured parties: 
[Congress] has assumed that costs under a no-fault, non-adversarial system will be 
significantly lower.  With most evidentiary requirements specified in the legislation, with 
prohibitions on traditional discovery and courtroom procedure, and with no obligations to 
demonstrate negligence or product defectiveness, the costs of legal services will more 
 
 178. Id.  For a critique of Professor LeRoy’s argument, see generally Lisa Blomgren Bingham 
& David Henning Good, A Better Solution to Moral Hazard in Employment Arbitration: It Is Time 
to Ban Predispute Binding Arbitration Clauses, 93 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 1 (2009). 
 179. See supra Part II. 
 180. See supra Part II. 
 181. Hans Smit, Contractual Modification of the Scope of Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, 
8 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 147, 149 (1997) (explaining why broad judicial review of arbitral awards 
would undermine finality); cf. Grey, Plague of Causation, supra note 89, at 404 (warning that, 
unless the Program is reformed, it “could become nothing more than a costly exercise that is a pre-
condition for filing a tort suit, placing vaccine claimants in a worse position than they were in prior 
to the [P]rogram’s enactment, since tort suits traditionally do not have antecedent administrative 
procedures that must be exhausted”). 
 182. See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text. 
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closely approximate those incurred in such systems as the Black Lung benefits program 
or workers’ compensation programs.  In these systems, legal costs rarely rise above 
$10,000 per case.  The Committee has, therefore, assumed that legal costs may be as 
much as $15,000 per case in the compensation Program.183 
Congress’s assumption has proven to be wrong.  Really wrong.  Not 
only are the costs of pursuing a claim in the Program routinely “as much as” 
$15,000, they usually total three-to-four times that amount.  Due largely to 
the increased adversarial nature of Program proceedings,184 resolving a claim 
filed under the Act often takes several years185 and costs tens of thousands of 
dollars to pursue.186  Many recent awards for fees and costs even approach—
or exceed—$100,000.187  In fiscal year 2009, petitioners whose cases went 
uncompensated received an average award of $43,254 for attorneys’ fees 
and costs.188  That amount was $2,000 higher than the average amount 
awarded in compensated cases.189 
V. EVIDENCE OF INCREASED CONTENTIOUSNESS AND MORAL HAZARD 
To sum, the Vaccine Act’s “free appeals” configuration undermines the 
intended expeditious, alternative nature of the Program by inviting and 
encouraging claimants to continue fighting their cases as long as possible.  It 
 
 183. H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 36 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6377-78. 
 184. See infra Part IV.A. 
 185. See infra text accompanying notes 216-17. 
 186. See infra notes 76-80, 218-22 and accompanying text. 
 187. See, e.g., Finet v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 03-348V, 2011 U.S. Claims 
LEXIS 120, at *11 (Fed. Cl. Jan. 31, 2011) (awarding $82,327.93 for attorneys’ fees and costs); 
Hibbard v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 07-446V, 2011 U.S. Claims LEXIS 439, at *18 
(Fed. Cl. Mar. 7, 2011) ($130,500); Mersburgh v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 04-997V, 
2011 U.S. Claims LEXIS 327, at *7 (Fed. Cl. Jan. 28, 2011) ($70,561.18); Browning v. Sec’y of 
Health & Human Servs., No. 02-929V, 2010 U.S. Claims LEXIS 761, at *59 (Fed. Cl. Sept. 27, 
2010) ($99,023.50); Nordwall v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 05-123V, 2010 U.S. Claims 
LEXIS 392, at *5 (Fed. Cl. May 26, 2010) ($82,500.00); Stewart v. Sec’y of Health & Human 
Servs., No. 06-287V, 2010 U.S. Claims LEXIS 336, at *23 (Fed. Cl. May 17, 2010) ($77,036.21); 
Stone v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 04-1041V, 2010 U.S. Claims LEXIS 753, at *32 
(Fed. Cl. Sept. 8, 2010) ($131,614.84); see also infra Part IV.C. 
 188. This figure was calculated by dividing the “Attorneys’ Fees/Costs Payments” by the 
“Number of Payments to Attorneys” for dismissed cases in fiscal year 2009, according to statistics 
reports posted on the website of the Department of Health and Human Services.  See National 
Vaccine Injury Compensation Program: Statistics Reports, HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVICES 
ADMIN. (U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Wash., D.C.), Feb. 2, 2012, at tbl.3 [hereinafter 
Statistics Reports], http://www.hrsa.gov/vaccinecompensation/statisticsreports.html#Stats. 
 189. The average fees and costs awarded in compensated cases during fiscal year 2009 was 
$41,147.  See id. (using data for compensated cases). 
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should come as no surprise, then, that both petitioners and the government 
have become increasingly adversarial, adopting litigious postures and tactics 
despite Congress’s intention to create an informal compensation system. 
A. Congressional Concern 
After creating the Vaccine Program, members of Congress soon realized 
that they had failed to design a truly alternative adjudication process.  
Claimants were “fighting everything,” racking up large bills for attorneys’ 
fees and costs, and filling appellate courts with vaccine cases.190  With a 
near-limitless supply of “free” money to establish causation, claimants 
began requesting depositions, calling expert witnesses, and moving to 
exclude harmful evidence.  The Program quickly became “a microcosm of 
the system it was designed to replace.”191 
In 1989, just three years after passing the Act, Congress declared that 
participants in the Program had “maintained their traditional adversarial 
litigation postures” and “virtually foreclose[d] any opportunity for 
petitioners [and] respondents to proceed without litigators at their sides.”192  
Claimants, for example, were pursuing “traditional rights of exclusion of 
evidence” and failing to comply with many of the Act’s procedural 
streamlining measures, including filing initial petitions with the statutorily 
required information.193 
Making matters worse, the special masters have not used their authority 
to remedy the petitioners’ noncompliance with statutory mandates.  Some 
special masters have even expressly permitted such noncompliance by 
allowing claimants to file one-page “short-form” petitions for compensation 
 
 190. Laura Mazzuca, Shot Through with Problems—A Partial Success, Vaccine Injury Fund 
Faces Case Logjam, Funding Shortfalls, BUS. INS., Aug. 24, 1992 (quoting Thomas G. Wilson, 
Chair of the Vaccine Litigation Group of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America). 
 191. Id.; see also Knudsen ex rel. Knudsen v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 35 F.3d 543, 
549 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“The Vaccine Act does not contemplate full blown tort litigation in the Court 
of Federal Claims.”); supra text accompanying notes 62-66. 
 192. H.R. REP. NO. 101-247, at 510 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1906, 2236.  
Scholars have observed a similar phenomenon in the context of arbitration, where parties seek a fast 
and flexible alternative dispute resolution process but have difficulty shedding their comfort with 
litigation tactics, rules, and procedures.  See, e.g., Gerald F. Phillips, Is Creeping Legalism Infecting 
Arbitration?, 58 DISP. RESOL. J. 37 (2003) (discussing concerns that arbitration is becoming overly 
formalized); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Forgetfulness, Fuzziness, Functionality, Fairness, and Freedom in 
Dispute Resolution: Serving Dispute Resolution Through Adjudication, 3 NEV. L.J. 305, 314 (2003) 
(using the term “arbigation” to describe the contentious postures of parties in arbitration 
proceedings); infra text accompanying note 210. 
 193. H.R. REP. NO. 101-247, at 510, 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2236. 
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that contain no medical records.194  Those filings violate the unambiguous 
language of section 11(c), which provides that all medical records “shall” 
accompany claims filed in the Program.195 
The government also deserves a portion of the blame.  Some claimants’ 
attorneys, for example, have noted that “government lawyers want to defeat 
every claim at all costs and for any reason.”196  As a result, “[t]here is now 
no difference in the level of litigation than if the case were in state or federal 
court.”197  Winning seems to have become the government’s focus, so much 
so that it often “mount[s] defenses incompatible with a nofault system of 
compensation.”198  An analysis of claims data by the Los Angeles Times in 
2004 revealed some troubling examples: 
In one case, government representatives argued that $150 a year was too much to spend 
on wheelchair maintenance.  They have haggled over how much to allow for replacement 
shoes and braces for people with polio.  Another time, they recommended rubber sheets 
for the bed of an incontinent person because they were cheaper, although less 
comfortable, than disposables costing $135 a year.199 
 
 194. See, e.g., Stewart v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 02-819V, 2003 U.S. Claims 
LEXIS 275, at *13 (Fed. Cl. Sept. 3, 2003) (finding that special masters may refuse to dismiss short-
form petitions and may refuse to order production of all medical records required by section 11(c)).  
For an example of a short-form petition, see Filing a Pro Se Short Form Autism Petition, 
SHOEMAKER & ASSOCIATES, available at 
http://www.shoemakerassociates.com/potentialclients/Short_formAutismPetition.doc (last visited 
Feb. 24, 2012). 
 195. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(c) (2006) (listing what a petition for compensation “shall contain,” 
including medical records and affidavits).  For a discussion about why permitting short-form 
petitions in the Vaccine Program could harm claimants, see generally Gordon Shemin, Comment, 
Mercury Rising: The Omnibus Autism Proceeding and What Families Should Know Before Rushing 
Out of Vaccine Court, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 459 (2008) (explaining that a short-form petition is not a 
proper petition under section 11(c) and so claimants who do not re-file a compliant petition may fail 
to satisfy the Act’s statute of limitations, thereby waiving their rights to reject an adverse special 
master decision and file a lawsuit in civil court). 
 196. JOHNSON, DREW & MILETICH, supra note 55, at 45 (quoting an anonymous claimant’s 
attorney); cf. Rachel A. Greenleaf, Why Plaintiffs Shouldn’t Have It Their Way—Revisiting 
Concurrent Jurisdiction of Autism Claims Against Thimerosal Manufacturers, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 299, 
307 (2011) (“[D]espite being touted as less adversarial than traditional litigation, the U.S. 
Department of Justice assigned more than a dozen veteran litigators to zealously defend the 
government’s coffers.”). 
 197. JOHNSON, DREW & MILETICH, supra note 55, at 45. 
 198. H.R. REP. NO. 101-247, at 510, 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2236; cf. Sussman, supra note 106, 
at 22 (“If the parties jointly seek to extend or complicate the arbitration, they may obstruct the 
arbitrator’s ability to achieve efficiency goals.”). 
 199. Myron Levin, Vaccine Injury Claims Face Grueling Fight; Victims Increasingly View U.S. 
Compensation Program as Adversarial and Tightfisted, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2004, at A1. 
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These illustrations of the government’s “contentious and even stingy”200 
posture are inconsistent with Congress’s goal of generously compensating 
victims in an informal, nonadversarial process.201 
Although claimants and the government share some of the blame for 
permitting the Program to “become very adversarial,”202 the special masters 
deserve most of the blame.  After all, they have incredible power to control 
the claims-resolution process,203 but have not used that authority to insulate 
the Program from the combative tactics of civil litigation.  As one extreme 
example, consider Cedillo v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, a case 
filed in 1998.204  The special master did not issue a ruling in the case until 
2009.205  Over that 11-year period, the parties developed a record of nearly 
8,000 pages, 23 expert reports, and 6 post-hearing briefs totaling 462 
pages.206  As another example, consider Kolakowski v. Secretary of Health & 
Human Services, which also took the special master 11 years to resolve.207  
In that timeframe, the special master held 2 separate trials in 2 separate 
states.208  The Kolakowski decision denying compensation spans almost 200 
pages. 
The special masters need to take control of the Vaccine Program.  
Congress has called for a “re-dedication of all parties to the creation of an 
expeditious, non-adversarial, and fair system.”209  The impetus for such 
change must come from the top down.  Claimants understandably fight 
zealously for their cases, and the government understandably responds in 
kind.  It is not understandable, however, for the special masters to allow the 
parties to transform the Program into an “adversarial process [that] will 
serve neither to compensate injured children nor maintain the stability of the 
immunization programs of the U.S.”210 
 
 200. Scott, supra note 48, at 362. 
 201. H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 3 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6344. 
 202. Levin, supra note 199, at A1 (quoting Rep. Dan Burton). 
 203. See supra notes 107-16 and accompanying text. 
 204. Cedillo v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 98-916V, 2009 U.S. Claims LEXIS 146 
(Fed. Cl. Feb. 12, 2009). 
 205. Id. at *42-44. 
 206. Id. at *46-47. 
 207. Kolakowski v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 2010 U.S. Claims LEXIS 1035 (Fed. Cl. 
Nov. 23, 2010).  The Kolakowski case was filed on August 4, 1999, and decided on November 23, 
2010.  Id. at *2. 
 208. Id. at *2-3. 
 209. H.R. REP. NO. 101-247, at 509 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1906, 2235; see 
also id. at 513, 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2239. 
 210. Id. at 510, 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2236; see also id. at 513, 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2239 
(“The Committee reiterates its concern that [the new amendments to the Act] not be used to re-create 
an adversarial process before the Special Masters.”). 
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In arbitration, it is common for arbitrators to “get swept along” with 
lawyers who “retreat to tried and true litigation methods.”211  The same thing 
is happening in the Program.  And just as arbitrators must guard against 
proceedings becoming unproductively adversarial, so too must special 
masters use their authority to prevent the parties from morphing the Program 
into a microcosm of the civil tort system.  Such pseudo-litigation has eroded 
the alternative features of the Program.  In 1989, Congress described the 
adversarial nature of the Program as one of the “most important . . . 
fundamental problems” with the adjudicatory process.212  Over the ensuing 
twenty years, the special masters have idly, meekly, and passively let things 
get worse. 
B. Slow Case Resolution Times 
As the eleven-year disposition times of Cedillo and Kolakowski 
demonstrate, case resolution within the Program is incredibly slow.213  The 
Act requires special masters to issue their decisions within 240 days of a 
petition’s filing,214 but they meet that deadline in only a small fraction of 
cases.  The Government Accountability Office reports that only 14% of 
claims are resolved in 1 year or less.215  A staggering 18% took 5 years or 
more to process.216 
Indeed, case resolution in the Program may take longer than it would in 
the traditional court system.  Between 2002 and 2007, it took an average of 
1,000 days (33.3 months) for special masters to resolve a vaccine petition.217  
That timeframe is longer than the average disposition time for all cases filed 
 
 211. Holt, supra note 117, at 459. 
 212. H.R. REP. NO. 101-247, at 509, 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2235; see also JOHNSON, DREW & 
MILETICH, supra note 55, at 44 (reporting that making proceedings “less adversarial and litigious” 
was the most common suggestion for how to improve the Program in a survey of claimants’ 
attorneys, government attorneys, and special masters); Scott, supra note 48, at 363 (stating that “the 
biggest problem” with the Vaccine Program is “its adversarial nature that has angered parties on 
both sides and hindered recovery for injured children”). 
 213. Kolakowski, 2010 U.S. Claims LEXIS 1035; Cedillo v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 
No. 98-916V, 2009 U.S. Claims LEXIS 146 (Fed. Cl. Feb. 12, 2009). 
 214. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(d)(3)(A)(ii) (2006). 
 215. GAO, VACCINE INJURY COMPENSATION, supra note 82, at 7. 
 216. Id. at 8 fig.1; see also Levin, supra note 199 (“[C]ases dragging beyond five years have 
become increasingly common.”). 
 217. Advisory Commission on Childhood Vaccines, Meeting and Conference Call Minutes, 
Health Resources & Services Admin. (U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Wash., D.C.), Mar. 7-
8, 2007, at 18, available at ftp://ftp.hrsa.gov/vaccinecompensation/ACCVMinutesMar7-8-07.pdf. 
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in state court (30.2 months) and only slightly shorter than the mean 
disposition times for medical malpractice (38.4 months) and toxic tort cases 
(35.8 months).218  It is also substantially longer than the median length of 
time that it takes to arbitrate business-to-business cases (7.9 months) and 
complex international disputes (12 months).219 
These prolonged case disposition times have many adverse 
consequences within the Program.  Delays usually lead to increased 
litigation costs, spoliation of evidence, and the disappointment and 
frustration of those seeking compensation.220  One of Congress’s goals for 
the Program—and one of the primary advantages of any alternative dispute 
resolution scheme—is speedy case resolution.221  Parties in the Program do 
not enjoy that benefit. 
C. Increasing Fees and Costs 
Given the increasingly prolonged and adversarial nature of proceedings 
in the Program, one would expect that the cost of pursuing a claim has 
increased over the years.222  That hypothesis is also suggested because a 
greater proportion of claimants are pursuing off-Table theories of 
causation,223 which require more evidence—and thus more time and effort—
to establish than their on-Table counterparts. 
Data from the Program confirm this hypothesis.  As Chart 1 shows, the 
average fees and costs awarded in uncompensated cases substantially 







 218. Michael Heise, Justice Delayed?: An Empirical Analysis of Civil Case Disposition Time, 
50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 813, 833 fig.1 (2000). 
 219. Sussman, supra note 106, at 21. 
 220. Heise, supra note 218, at 814-15 (discussing how delays impact the civil justice system). 
 221. See, e.g., Frank E.A. Sander & Lukasz Rozdeiczer, Matching Cases and Dispute 
Resolution Procedures: Detailed Analysis Leading to a Mediation Centered Approach, 11 HARV. 
NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 12 tbl.2 (2006) (quantifying the ability of mediation, mini-trials, summary jury 
trials, early neutral case evaluation, arbitration, and adjudication to satisfy a variety of dispute 
resolution goals); Sussman, supra note 106, at 20 (noting that arbitration is often preferable to 
litigation because arbitration can “provide for a much speedier resolution than can be found in 
court”). 
 222. Cf. Scott, supra note 48, at 362 (“The adversarial nature of the program undoubtedly 
contributes to the cost and reduces the efficiency of the program . . . .”). 
 223. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text. 
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The historical trend of awards in dismissed cases outpacing inflation is 
particularly pronounced in recent years.  In 2002, the average fees and costs 
awarded was $15,593; in 2010, that amount more than doubled to 
$33,683.225  These figures prove that modern-day petitioners and their 
attorneys spend significantly more time and money pursuing uncompensated 
claims than their predecessors did in the 1990s.226  Although the data do not 
reveal exactly where these additional costs are occurring—for example, in 
proceedings before special masters or appellate courts—they do show that 
 
 224. The data for the average annual fees and costs awarded are derived from statistics reports 
released by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.  See Statistics Reports, supra note 
188, at tbl.3.  The average award was calculated by dividing the figure for “Attorneys’ Fees/Costs 
Payments” by the figure for “Number of Payments to Attorneys.”  The inflation-adjusted data are 
calculated by increasing the average award in 1993 by the annual rate of inflation as derived from 
the Consumer Price Index released by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  See Consumer Price Index, 
BUREAU LAB. STAT. (U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wash., D.C.), Feb. 17, 2012, 
ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiai.txt. 
 225. See Statistics Reports, supra note 188, at tbl.3; supra note 224 and accompanying text. 
 226. See Statistics Reports, supra note 188, at tbl.3; supra note 224 and accompanying text. 
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claimants and their attorneys are fighting harder than ever to obtain 
compensation in the Program.227 
One might expect that if claimants have been spending more money 
pursuing uncompensated cases, they likely have been spending more money 
pursuing compensated cases.  But that is not the case.  Perhaps surprisingly, 
the average amount of fees and costs awarded in compensated cases has not 
outpaced inflation over the past eighteen years: 
 
Chart 2: Average Fees and Costs Awarded in Compensated Cases228 
 
 
One potential explanation for the different growth rates of awards in 
uncompensated and compensated cases is that, because longer dispositions 
cost more than shorter dispositions, unmeritorious claims take longer to 
resolve than meritorious claims.  Thus, one might expect that 
uncompensated claims take longer to resolve because petitioners more 
frequently appeal uncompensated cases than the government appeals 
compensated cases.  In other words, claimants spend the same amount of 
time and money in proceedings before special masters, but, unlike the 
government, claimants continue to fight adverse special master decisions on 
appeal, thereby extending the case disposition time and incurring additional 
costs in uncompensated cases that they do not incur in compensated cases. 
This explanation makes sense when one considers the fact that the Act’s 
current structure requires the government to be more selective than 
claimants when deciding which cases to appeal because the government 
 
 227. See Statistics Reports, supra note 188, at tbl.3; supra note 224 and accompanying text. 
 228. See Statistics Reports, supra note 188, at tbl.3 (using data for compensated cases); supra 
note 224 and accompanying text. 
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pays its own way for appealing a case.229  But because of the Vaccine Act’s 
structural moral hazard, claimants do not pay their own way and do not 
similarly evaluate the costs and risks of appealing an adverse decision.230  So 
as Program proceedings become more adversarial, claimants and their 
attorneys are racking up larger bills in uncompensated cases, unconcerned 
with spending money to fight their cases on appeal.231  The government does 
not have that luxury, and usually stops fighting a case after the special 
master awards compensation, thus keeping costs in compensated cases 
relatively stable and substantially lower than costs in uncompensated 
cases.232 
D. Lopsided Appellate Filings 
Other data indicate that this explanation is correct.  Between 1995 and 
2011, the Federal Circuit decided seventy-five Vaccine Act cases.233  The 
claimants filed seventy (ninety-three percent) of those appeals.234  Such 
disparity between the claimants’ and government’s proclivity to appeal 
continues even after the Federal Circuit enters judgment.  After the circuit 
court decided those seventy-five cases, claimants moved for a rehearing or a 
rehearing en banc twelve times and filed thirteen petitions for certiorari.235  
The Secretary moved for a rehearing only three times and never filed a 
petition for certiorari.236 
These party differences stand in stark contrast to traditional tort 
litigation where plaintiffs and defendants file appeals at roughly the same 
rate.237  Admittedly, some disparity normally exists when the United States 
 
 229. See What You Need to Know About the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program 
(VICP), HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVICES ADMIN. (U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Wash., 
D.C.), Feb. 2006, at 5, available at ftp://ftp.hrsa.gov/vaccinecompensation/84521_Booklet.pdf 
(explaining that the Vaccine Program pays legal costs regardless of whether a claimant prevails if 
the claimant meets certain requirements). 
 230. See supra Part III.C. 
 231. See supra notes 187-89, 224-27 and accompanying text. 
 232. See infra notes 234-37 and accompanying text. 
 233. See infra Appendix. 
 234. See infra Appendix; cf. JOHNSON, DREW & MILETICH, supra note 55, at 23 (reporting that 
claimants filed 81% of the appeals filed in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims between 1990 and 
1997). 
 235. See infra Appendix. 
 236. See infra Appendix. 
 237. See Thomas H. Cohen, Appeals from General Civil Trials in 46 Large Counties, 2001-
2005, BUREAU JUST. STAT. (U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Wash., D.C.), June 2006, at 4 & tbl.2, available 
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is a party because the federal government is a more cautious and calculated 
litigant than private parties.238  But that fact alone cannot account for such 
lopsided numbers in the Vaccine Program.  Here again, moral hazard best 
explains the data: the government must carefully evaluate whether to risk its 
limited resources filing an appeal,239 but claimants are free from such 
burdens and are instead perversely incentivized to continue fighting their 
unsuccessful claims for as long as possible.240 
VI. SOLUTIONS 
A. Add Injuries to the Vaccine Table 
As described above, when the Secretary added new vaccines to the 
Table without listing corresponding injuries, the percentage of off-Table 
cases in the Program changed from ten to ninety percent.241  Most cases now 
involve complex theories of medical causation that require more evidence, 
more time, and more money to resolve than on-Table claims.242  Indeed, 
“much of the slowdown in petition processing is attributed to delays granted 
to petitioners who need more time to build a case, which includes 
performing medical tests, determining the developmental needs of the child, 
and hiring expert witnesses.”243  Those reasons for delay are not present 
when claimants can establish a prima facie case simply by showing they 
suffered an injury listed on the Table.244 
Presumably, then, the trend will reverse if the Secretary adds new 
injuries to the Table: the number of off-Table cases will decrease and 
claimants will devote less time and money to establishing causation.  And as 
the Table’s streamlining presumptions perform the “heavy lifting” for 
 
at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/agctlc05.pdf (“Among tort trials appealed, plaintiffs 
(53%) were slightly more likely to be appellants than defendants (47%).”). 
 238. Paul D. Carrington, United States Appeals in Civil Cases: A Field and Statistical Study, 11 
HOUS. L. REV. 1101, 1102 (1974); see also Cohen, supra note 237, at 3 tbl.4. 
 239. Cf. Carrington, supra note 238, at 1102 (“[A]lmost without exception, the Justice 
Department appears to approach the decisions [of whether to appeal a case] as rational ones, to be 
made on the basis of careful analysis of the principles likely to control the outcome, with due regard 
for judicial sentiments likely to be evoked by the particular circumstances in dispute.”). 
 240. See supra Part III. 
 241. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
 242. Cf. Miller, supra note 130, at 262-64. 
 243. Id. at 262-63. 
 244. See Althen v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 418 F.3d 1274, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(stating that “the purpose of the Vaccine Act’s preponderance standard is to allow the finding of 
causation”). 
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claimants,245 the parties will have fewer incentives to litigate whether 
sufficient proof of causation exists.  Proceedings in the Program, therefore, 
will become more expeditious and less contentious. 
But the government should be careful before adding new injuries to the 
Table and memorializing in it a causal relationship between vaccines and 
harm.  Forcing the Secretary to add new injuries to the Table could 
undermine the public’s confidence in the safety of vaccines.  One might 
argue, for example, that the Secretary has not added new injuries to the 
Table because no such injuries exist—that is, the Table already contains all 
adverse reactions that the scientific community recognizes as causally 
related to vaccines.  Thus, the Secretary did not—and should not—add new 
presumptive injuries to the Table because doing so would inject junk science 
onto the Table and into the adjudicatory process.  Put another way, neither 
the Secretary nor Congress should overstate the dangerousness of vaccines 
by including injuries on the Table that do not derive from reliable scientific 
evidence.  Otherwise, the government could spark unwarranted public fear, 
which could lead to distrust of vaccines, decreased vaccination rates, and 
increased incidences of preventable diseases.246 
This argument against amending the Table is persuasive, but it does not 
apply in those circumstances where the government has already concluded 
that vaccines cause injuries not listed on the Table; in those circumstances, 
any adverse public health consequences have already passed.  In 1994, for 
example, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) found that “evidence favors 
acceptance of a causal relationship between . . . tetanus toxoids and Guillain-
Barré syndrome,”247 yet the Secretary consistently declines to add that 
 
 245. Hodges v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 9 F.3d 958, 961 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
 246. Justice Breyer made a similar point when discussing the need for scientific accuracy in 
toxic substance cases: 
 
[A] decision wrongly granting compensation, while of immediate benefit to the plaintiff 
worker, can . . . improperly force abandonment of the substance.  This, if the decision is 
wrong, will improperly deprive the public of what can be far more important benefits—
say those surrounding a drug that cures many while subjecting to less serious risk a few. 
 
Stephen Breyer, The Interdependence of Science and Law, 82 JUDICATURE 24, 25 (1998); see also 
Boxler, supra note 115, at 1328-34 (discussing the need for “accurate science-based jurisprudence” 
because “[a]ny legal decision involving an alleged vaccine injury has the potential to produce 
significant—and adverse—public health consequences”). 
 247. INST. OF MED., ADVERSE EVENTS ASSOCIATED WITH CHILDHOOD VACCINES: EVIDENCE 
BEARING ON CAUSALITY 16 (Kathleen R. Stratton, Cynthia J. Howe & Richard B. Johnston, Jr. eds., 
1994).  Guillain-Barré syndrome, also known as acute inflammatory demyelinating polyneuritis or 
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condition to the Table.248  According to the Secretary, the refusal is “based to 
some extent on the level of risk in compensating an inordinate number of 
non-vaccine-related cases for the extremely rare vaccine-related case.”249  In 
other words, the Secretary has not added Guillain-Barré syndrome to the 
Table because doing so might overcompensate claimants. 
That result, however, is precisely what Congress intended for the 
Program.250  “Congress designed the Vaccine Table Injury to be 
overinclusive . . . [and] recognized that some children whose injuries were 
not vaccine-related would recover through the Table’s presumption.”251  One 
of the Table’s primary functions is to ensure that special masters resolve 
close cases in favor of petitioners.252  That generosity inevitably means that 
some non-vaccine-related claims will benefit from the Table’s 
presumptions.253  Congress intentionally sacrificed accuracy to accomplish 
efficiency, tilting the legal balance slightly in favor of claimants in an effort 
to achieve a streamlined case-resolution process.254  By not amending the 
Table, the Secretary has moved the fulcrum.255  The balance now favors 
contentiousness and formality instead of expediency and informality.256  
That shift is not only improper for injuries the government’s own scientists 
conclude are causally related to vaccines, it is also inconsistent with the 
alternative nature the Program.257 
The Secretary should therefore adopt—or Congress should legislate—a 
per se rule that amends the Table when the Institute of Medicine 
acknowledges a causal link between an injury and a vaccine listed on the 
Table.258  This rule would remove governmentally recognized harms from 
the litigious off-Table adjudicatory process and leave undisturbed the 
Secretary’s discretion to add other injuries to the Table for various scientific 
or policy reasons.259 
 
postinfectious neuritis, “is characterized by the rapid onset of flaccid motor weakness with 
depression of tendon reflexes and inflammatory demyelination of peripheral nerves.”  Id. at 34. 
 248. See GAO, VACCINE INJURY COMPENSATION, supra note 82, at 15. 
 249. Id. 
 250. See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text. 
 251. Shifflett v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 30 Fed. Cl. 341, 345 (1994). 
 252. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
 253. See Are Reforms Needed?, supra note 82, at 10. 
 254. See GAO, VACCINE INJURY COMPENSATION, supra note 82, at 13. 
 255. See Are Reforms Needed?, supra note 82, at 10. 
 256. See id. 
 257. See GAO, VACCINE INJURY COMPENSATION, supra note 82, at 32. 
 258. Cf. Grey, Plague of Causation, supra note 89, at 408 (calling for the expanded use of 
educated scientific bodies like the IOM “to provide sufficient scientific input on causation” within 
the Vaccine Program). 
 259. See GAO, VACCINE INJURY COMPENSATION, supra note 82, at 5. 
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This per se rule would also leave undisturbed the Secretary’s ability to 
challenge petitions that are truly “non-vaccine related cases.”260  Even if 
claimants meet their prima facie burden by demonstrating that they suffered 
an on-Table injury, the government may nonetheless challenge 
compensation if it concludes that the Table has helped the claimant too 
much.261  The Act expressly provides that special masters should deny 
compensation if the Secretary proves that an on-Table injury is “due to 
factors unrelated to the administration of the vaccine.”262 
Finally, the Secretary should periodically review Vaccine Act case law 
to learn what types of off-Table claims special masters are compensating.263  
If, for example, special masters are routinely siding with claimants alleging a 
particular type of injury not listed on the Table, then the Secretary should 
consider that tide of jurisprudence as strong evidence that a sufficiently 
legal—not necessarily medical—causal relationship exists for the injury to 
be included on the Table.264  Or, at the very least, the government should 
settle those cases instead of contentiously putting claimants to their 
burden.265  Indeed, many special masters routinely compensate cases 
alleging a causal relationship between the tetanus vaccine and Guillain-Barré 
syndrome,266 which further dictates that the Secretary should add that injury 
to the Table.267 
 
 260. Id. at 17. 
 261. See id. at 21. 
 262. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-13(a)(1)(B) (2006); see also Knudsen ex rel. Knudsen v. Sec’y of 
Health & Human Servs., 35 F.3d 543, 547 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
 263. See Whitney S. Waldenberg & Sarah E. Wallace, When Science Is Silent: Examining 
Compensation of Vaccine-Related Injuries when Scientific Evidence of Causation Is Inconclusive, 42 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 303, 322 (2007). 
 264. For example, only six percent of claims alleging certain demyelinating disorders from 
hepatitis B vaccine were compensated between 1995 and 2000, but since that time, over eighty 
percent of such claims have been compensated, which suggests that current special masters presume 
entitlement to compensation for those injuries.  See id. at 321-22. 
 265. See id. at 305. 
 266. Id. at 314 n.83 (listing cases). 
 267. Several other special master decisions have accepted a causal relationship between 
Guillain-Barré syndrome and the hepatitis B, polio, and diphtheria-pertussis-tetanus vaccines, yet the 
Table does not list the condition as an adverse affect for any of the vaccines.  See id. 
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B. Eliminate the Moral Hazard 
1. Restructuring Appellate Procedures 
The perverse incentives described in Part III.C derive from the 
intersection of the Act’s multiple levels of appellate review and its fee-
shifting provision.268  Both aspects of the statute are thus possible targets for 
reform to mitigate or eliminate the moral hazard that exists in the 
Program.269 
To change the Act’s appellate process, Congress could restrict the 
number of appeals available to a losing party.  It could, for example, make 
special master decisions unreviewable.  But that reform creates the obvious 
problems of unchecked partiality, corruption, and misconduct.  Another 
option is to make the U.S. Court of Federal Claims the only level of appeal.  
That change would at least limit the length of the appellate review process, 
thereby reducing the costs and time spent appealing special master decisions. 
Congress could also change the appellate process by heightening the 
standard of review applied to special master decisions, making it less likely 
that a losing party will prevail on appeal and (theoretically) dissuading 
petitions for review.  The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),270 for example, 
encourages finality of arbitrator decisions by permitting judges to reverse a 
decision for only the most egregious errors, such as evident partiality, fraud, 
or corruption.271  Echoing what Congress and the Federal Circuit have said 
about the finality and deference afforded to special master decisions,272 
many courts interpreting the FAA emphasize that judicial review of an 
arbitrator’s judgment is so “exceedingly narrow”273 that “perhaps it ought 
not be called ‘review’ at all.”274 
 
 268. See Baker, supra note 171, at 238. 
 269. Id. 
 270. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2006). 
 271. Id. § 10(a). 
 272. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text. 
 273. Kane Gas Light & Heating Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of Firemen & Oilers, Local 112, 687 F.2d 
673, 675 (3d Cir. 1982). 
 274. Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 706 (7th Cir. 1994); see also 
United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36 (1987) (“[C]ourts play only a 
limited role when asked to review the decision of an arbitrator.”); Ario v. Underwriting Members of 
Syndicate 53 at Lloyds, 618 F.3d 277, 295-96 (3d Cir. 2010); Equitable Res., Inc. v. United Steel, 
Local 8-512, 621 F.3d 538, 545 (6th Cir. 2010) (“We must affirm the arbitrator’s decision even if we 
believe that the arbitrator made serious, improvident or silly errors in resolving the merits of the 
dispute, which allows us to vacate only the most egregious arbitral awards.” (citations and quotation 
omitted)); World Bus. Paradise, Inc. v. SunTrust Bank, No. 10-13119, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 
24254, at *2-3 (11th Cir. Nov. 23, 2010) (“The FAA presumes that arbitration awards will be 
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The deference the FAA affords to arbitrator decisions is particularly 
appropriate because it would undermine the federal policy of encouraging 
arbitration if courts ultimately resolved the merits of arbitrated cases.275  In 
other words, expanded judicial review of arbitral awards would “create 
hybrid, two-step procedures that waste public and private resources and are 
inconsistent with the FAA . . . goals and functions.”276 
So too with the Vaccine Program.  Its current structure undermines 
Congress’s goal of establishing a viable alternative to litigation because 
claimants can easily bypass a special master’s decision and ask an Article III 
judge to decide the case.277  The Program’s institutional function is similarly 
destabilized.  Instead of providing a generous, swift, and nonadversarial 
route to compensation, those injured by vaccines must instead suffer through 
years of a costly, uncertain, and contentious appellate review process.278 
These two reforms—limiting the number of appeals and heightening the 
standard of review—would reduce the amount of resources spent 
challenging a special master decision.  Yet they both fail to address the 
Program’s underlying structural moral hazard.  Neither reform addresses the 
perverse incentives for claimants to enter the appellate process in the first 
place.279 
The problem with the Program is not simply the number of courts that 
review special master decisions; appellate courts serve important functions 
like protecting rights and unifying the law.  Nor is the problem with the 
standard that courts apply when conducting their review; the current abuse 
 
confirmed, and federal courts should defer to an arbitrator’s decision whenever possible.” (quotation 
and citation omitted)).  But cf. Michael H. Leroy, Are Arbitrators Above the Law? The “Manifest 
Disregard of the Law” Standard, 52 B.C. L. REV. 137, 139 (2011) (suggesting that many federal 
courts of appeals actually deviate from arbitral finality and “overturn a high percentage” of certain 
arbitration awards). 
 275. Misco, 484 U.S. at 36. 
 276. Amy J. Schmitz, Ending a Mud Bowl: Defining Arbitration’s Finality Through Functional 
Analysis, 37 GA. L. REV. 123, 181-82 (2002); see also Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade 
Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 998 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Broad judicial review of arbitration decisions could 
well jeopardize the very benefits of arbitration, rendering informal arbitration merely a prelude to a 
more cumbersome and time-consuming judicial review process.”); Tom Ginsburg, The Arbitrator as 
Agent: Why Deferential Review Is Not Always Pro-Arbitration, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1013, 1014 
(2010) (commenting that, if review of arbitrator awards is not limited, “the benefits of arbitration in 
terms of speed, cost, and finality may be lost because the parties will frequently appeal arbitral 
awards to the courts”). 
 277. Jessen v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 94-1029V, 1997 U.S. Claims LEXIS 20, at 
*16-17 (Fed. Cl. Jan. 17, 1997) (noting “the Program goal of keeping cases out of the tort system”). 
 278. Id. at *21. 
 279. See Baker, supra note 171, at 238-39. 
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of discretion standard means that special master decisions are already 
“virtually unchallengeable on appeal.”280  These two reforms are band aids, 
not cures.  They merely contain the damage caused by the Act’s structural 
flaw; they do not heal the underlying ailment. 
2. Amend Section 15(e) 
The proper way to remedy the Act’s structural moral hazard is by 
mitigating the incentives that claimants have to file an appeal.  Congress 
must shift some of the risks and costs of appealing a case onto claimants and 
their attorneys.  Those transfers would reduce moral hazard by forcing 
claimants to absorb some of the pecuniary risk associated with seeking 
review of a special master decision denying compensation. 
The law, however, should not move to the other extreme and require 
claimants to fund their own cases entirely.  The Program must remain 
accessible to all people suffering from vaccine injuries.  Any amendment to 
the Act must ensure that cost considerations do not prevent victims from 
entering the Program. 
The same is true of claimants’ access to the appellate courts.  If a special 
master decision was erroneous, then claimants should be able to obtain relief 
without bearing the burden of funding an appeal.  Claimants should not be 
“trapped” by an adverse special master decision, which could cause 
dissatisfaction within the Program and lead to manifest injustice.281  Any 
statutory remedy, therefore, must protect the right of claimants to challenge 
special master decisions while simultaneously eliminating the moral hazard 
that permits claimants to appeal without incurring any risk of loss. 
To strike this balance, the Program could reimburse claimants for the 
fees and costs of pursuing an appeal only if the appeal is successful.  This 
reform would essentially adopt a unilateral “loser-pays” policy.282  When 
claimants lose an appeal, they pay their own expenses; when they win, the 
government reimburses their costs. 
A pure “loser-pays” policy goes too far, however, because if indigent 
claimants have a legitimate challenge to a special master’s ruling, their 
willingness to pursue that argument should not be contingent upon their 
 
 280. Lampe v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 219 F.3d 1357, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 281. Cf. Ginsburg, supra note 276, at 1014 (noting that, if review of arbitrator awards is too 
limited, “arbitrators might deliver poor-quality decisions that undermine the attractiveness of 
arbitration as a whole”). 
 282. For a comparison of the “American rule” cost regime, in which parties bear their own 
expenses irrespective of the outcome, and the “loser-pays rule,” in which losers compensate winners 
for their costs, see Susan D. Franck, Rationalizing Costs in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 88 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 769, 791-95 (2011). 
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attorney’s ability to forecast success.  Even the best attorneys and brightest 
scholars cannot always accurately predict what an appellate court will 
decide,283 and very few (if any) special master decisions are certain to be 
overturned on appeal.284  Nor is appellate review necessarily a bad thing.  A 
decision from the Federal Circuit can resolve discrepancies in the law, even 
if doing so involves sustaining a decision denying compensation.  The 
Vaccine Act should encourage some level of appellate activity. 
A better rule is to make claimants bear some—but not all—of the 
financial risk of seeking review of an adverse special master decision.  For 
example, the Act could establish a cap on the amount of fees available for 
conducting an appeal, which claimants could receive regardless of the 
ultimate case disposition.  A cap, however, is an inflexible and arbitrary 
solution that could not respond to legitimate cost discrepancies for variations 
of attorney skill, experience, or preparation.285  Nor could it provide extra 
payment for unusually burdensome representation in a particularly complex 
case.  And caps always present the “unacceptable risk that counsel will limit 
the amount of time invested in the representation in order to maximize the 
return on the fixed fee.”286 
The best solution, therefore, is to amend the Vaccine Act to reimburse 
claimants for only half of the fees and costs expended when they pursue an 
ultimately unsuccessful appeal.  This rule would not apply to cases in which 
the government seeks review of a special master decision—all fees and costs 
incurred while defending a decision awarding compensation would be 
reimbursable.  This rule would also leave unchanged the fee-shifting rules 
for proceedings before special masters.  Thus, the amended Act would not 
prevent any indigents from filing a petition for compensation in the Program 
and asking a special master to pass on its merits. 
To effect this change, Congress should add the following language to 
section 15(e) of the Vaccine Act: 
This subsection applies only to proceedings conducted before a special master.  If the 
special master denies compensation, petitioners shall pay half of their own reasonably 
 
 283. See generally Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies 
that Attempt to Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895 
(2009) (discussing why judicial decisionmaking is such a difficult object of empirical investigation 
and scholarly inquiry). 
 284. See supra notes 122-31 and accompanying text. 
 285. See American Bar Association, Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of 
Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913, 987-88 (2003). 
 286. Id. at 988. 
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expended fees and costs for all subsequent appeals unless the final reviewing court 
reverses the special master’s decision.  If the special master or any reviewing court 
awards compensation to a petitioner and the Secretary seeks review of that decision, this 
subsection shall apply. 
This amendment shifts to claimants and their attorneys some financial 
burden of seeking review of a special master decision denying 
compensation.  If the claimant ultimately prevails on appeal, however, all 
fees and costs incurred in any proceeding on the case—including appeals—
are reimbursable.  If the claimant ultimately loses, then any fees and costs 
incurred before a special master, and half of the fees and costs incurred on 
appeal, are reimbursable. 
C. Potential Objections 
My proposed amendment to section 15(e) is subject to at least three 
criticisms.  First, that it will encourage attorney misconduct; second, that it 
will backfire and actually increase the contentiousness of Program 
proceedings; and third, that shifting any costs onto claimants will 
disadvantage people who lack the resources to afford an attorney.  This 
subsection discusses and rebuts each counterargument. 
1. This Will Encourage Excessive Billing 
One might argue that amending the Act’s fee-shifting provision to 
reimburse only half of the fees and costs incurred on appeal would create 
another type of perverse incentive: encouraging attorneys to bill unnecessary 
hours to guard against the possibility of “losing” half of their fees on an 
unsuccessful appeal.  Put another way, counsel will hedge their bets and bill 
more hours than reasonably necessary to provide effective representation. 
The proposed amendment, however, would leave unchanged an 
important safeguard against this potential attorney misconduct: section 
15(e)(1)(A), which provides that special masters may award only 
“reasonable” attorneys’ fees and costs.287  A court scrutinizing an attorney’s 
request for payment could thus reduce the award if it finds that the attorney 
billed excessive hours or incurred unnecessary costs.  Special masters 
frequently reduce attorney requests for reimbursement for those exact 
reasons.288  And of course, rules regulating professional conduct would 
 
 287. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(e)(1)(A) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 288. See, e.g., Doe v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 2010 U.S. Claims LEXIS 47, at *27-28 
(Fed. Cl. Jan. 29, 2010) (awarding attorneys’ fees for only 22.7 hours of the requested 77.8 hours 
spent producing a post-hearing brief that was “25 pages in length, more than half of which 
(specifically, thirteen pages) are block quotes taken directly from the transcript”); Stone v. Sec’y of 
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remain in effect to deter and punish any particularly egregious attorney 
misbehavior. 
2. This Could Backfire 
Another counterargument is that, by decreasing claimants’ incentives to 
appeal an adverse decision, the initial case disposition would become 
excessively important.  Claimants will thus dedicate even more resources to 
obtain a beneficial special master decision, recognizing that they may have 
to fund part of the cost of appealing an adverse decision.  And by injecting 
more resources into the proceedings before special masters, the parties will 
inevitably seek more discovery, file more motions, and present more expert 
testimony.  In other words, my proposed amendment could backfire by 
making Program proceedings look even more like civil litigation. 
This counterargument fails because it turns the programmatic benefit of 
finality on its head.  Yes, the importance of special master decisions will 
increase because the amendment enhances the finality of their judgments.  
And yes, the amendment encourages claimants to put on their best evidence 
and make their strongest arguments as soon as possible.  But that is the 
point, not the problem.  The principal goal of amending the Act is to restore 
the Program’s integrity as an alternative dispute resolution forum, which 
means increasing the importance and finality of judgments issued by that 
forum.  Claimants undermine those goals when they circumvent the 
Program, advance their strongest arguments on appeal, and ask the Federal 
Circuit to resolve their case.  If my proposed amendment transforms special 
masters into the final arbiter of vaccine injury claims, it will be a success, 
not a failure. 
Regardless, it is unlikely that claimants will respond to the amendment 
by spending more time and money proving their cases to special masters.  
The standard of review applied to Program decisions is already very 
stringent,289 and counsel within the Program certainly know that it is difficult 
 
Health & Human Servs., No. 04-1041V, 2010 U.S. Claims LEXIS 753 at *2, *32 (Fed. Cl. Sept. 8, 
2010) (awarding $131,614.84 for attorneys’ fees and costs despite petitioners request for 
$157,873.86); Masias v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 2010 U.S. Claims LEXIS 209, at *2 (Fed. 
Cl. Apr. 14, 2010) (denying petitioner’s request for $59,072.50 in fees and awarding $25,851.40 
because petitioner “sought compensation for his attorney at an unreasonably high hourly rate”); 
Mueller v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 06-775V, 2010 U.S. Claims LEXIS 403, at *17 
(Fed. Cl. May 27, 2010) (reducing the amount of compensable attorney time by 52.8 hours because 
the amount requested was “excessive”). 
 289. See supra notes 123-26 and accompanying text. 
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to convince the U.S. Court of Federal Claims and the Federal Circuit to 
reverse special master decisions.290  Claimants are thus probably not 
withholding effort at the first stage of case adjudication.  The potential for 
increased resource expenditures during proceedings before special masters is 
minimal, at most. 
3. This Will Hurt Indigent Claimants 
The final objection to my proposed amendment is that shifting some 
financial risk of filing an appeal back onto claimants would hurt indigent 
petitioners and undermine Congress’s goal of ensuring that all people have 
access to legal counsel in the Program.291 
Eliminating the perverse incentives for claimants to seek appellate 
review, however, does not affect their ability to enter the Program in the first 
place.  Nor does it restrict the quality of legal representation that claimants 
receive during the initial adjudicatory process because all fees and costs 
incurred before special masters will remain reimbursable regardless of what 
the special master decides.  Plus, if a special master commits reversible 
error, the amended section 15(e) does not transfer to claimants the costs of 
remedying that error because the Program will still compensate fees incurred 
during a successful appeal.292 
It is also important to remember that even if the Act is amended as I 
propose here, the Program will remain a more claimant-friendly forum than 
the civil tort system where plaintiffs almost always pay their own attorneys’ 
fees and costs, even if they prevail.293 
 
 290. See Little, supra note 113, at 363-64 (explaining that, because the Act requires “the Court 
of Federal Claims to review [special master] decisions with substantial deference, the Federal Circuit 
is unlikely to provide compensation if the lower courts deny it”). 
 291. See supra note 134. 
 292. See Hines v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 26 Cl. Ct. 114 (1992) (holding that the 
special master had the authority to award attorneys’ fees and costs that were incurred while making 
an appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit). 
 293. See Franck, supra note 282, at 792 (discussing the “American rule” for litigation-related 
fees and costs); see also Jeff Holth, Comment, Civil Procedure: I Win, You Pay: Considerations of 
Efficiency and Fairness in Minnesota Appellate Litigation of Attorney’s Fees—T.A. Schifsky & 
Sons, Inc. v. Bahr Construction, LLC, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 267, 272-73 (2011).  The Vaccine 
Act’s claimant-friendly, fee-shifting regime partially explains why claimants rarely leave the 
Program and file traditional civil actions, which the Act permits after claimants have been in the 
Program for 420 days.  See supra note 63; cf. GAO, VACCINE INJURY COMPENSATION, supra note 
82, at 11 (reporting that no claimant had withdrawn a claim from the Program and filed suit in civil 
court). 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
The Vaccine Act is structurally flawed.  By providing claimants with 
nearly unlimited sums of money to appeal adverse special master decisions, 
the Program invites litigious posturing and tempts unsuccessful claimants to 
continue fighting in the appellate courts.  These perverse incentives 
undermine the Program’s function as an effective alternative forum for 
resolving disputes involving claims of vaccine injury. 
When Congress passed the Vaccine Act in 1986, it made a commitment 
to people who assume the risk of vaccination: if you suffer an adverse 
reaction, the law will provide an informal adjudicatory process for you to 
obtain compensation “quickly, easily, and with certainty and generosity.”294  
The government is not upholding its end of that social compact.  Over the 
past twenty-five years, case dispositions in the Program have become 
increasingly slow, costly, and adversarial.  Instead of being an effective 
alternative adjudicatory forum, the Program has morphed into a mere 
precursor to civil litigation in the federal courts—the very dispute resolution 
process that Congress wanted to replace. 
The easiest way to restore some of the Program’s integrity as a 
functional alternative to litigation is for special masters to prohibit parties 
from using tactics and adopting postures that are antithetical to quick, 
informal, and streamlined dispute resolution.  Another easy fix is for the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services to add new injuries to the Vaccine 
Table, thereby moving additional claims onto a less contentious path to 
compensation.  The best solution, however, is for Congress to reform the 
“free appeals” structure of the Program.  By eliminating that source of moral 
hazard, and by requiring claimants to evaluate the pecuniary risks of 
appealing an adverse special master decision, proceedings in the Program 
will become more final, more legitimate, and more efficient.  In other words, 
the Vaccine Program will begin to fulfill its purpose in the social compact. 
 
 294. H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 3 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6344. 
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APPENDIX: VACCINE PROGRAM CASES DECIDED BY THE U.S. COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT, 1995-2011 
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5, 2011). 
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(Fed. Cir. 





412 F. App’x 
302 (Fed. Cir. 





634 F.3d 1283 
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409 F. App’x 
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Shaw v. Sec’y 
of Health & 
Human Servs., 
609 F.3d 1372 
(Fed. Cir. 





604 F.3d 1343 
(Fed. Cir. 
2010). Claimant Affirmed Government 
 
no no 
Cloer v. Sec’y 
of Health & 
Human Servs., 
603 F.3d 1341 
(Fed. Cir. 
2010). Claimant Reversed Claimant yes no 
Doe v. Sec’y 
of Health & 
Human Servs., Claimant Affirmed Government no yes 
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593 F.3d 1343 
(Fed. Cir. 
2010). Claimant Affirmed Government no no 
Moberly ex 




592 F.3d 1315 
(Fed. Cir. 
2010). Claimant Affirmed Government yes no 





569 F.3d 1367 
(Fed. Cir. 
2009). Claimant Reversed Claimant no no 













287 F. App’x 
103 (Fed. Cir. Claimant Affirmed Government yes yes 
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nt Affirmed Claimant no no 
Avera v. Sec’y 
of Health & 
Human Servs., 










Gov’t) yes no 
Marks v. Sec’y 
of Health & 
Human Servs., 
268 F. App’x 
913 (Fed. Cir. 





485 F.3d 1146 
(Fed. Cir. 





477 F.3d 1353 
(Fed. Cir. 
2007). Claimant Affirmed Government no yes 
Wiley v. Sec’y 
of Health & 
Human Servs., 
211 F. App’x 
960 (Fed. Cir. 
2007). Claimant Affirmed Government no no 
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Aull v. Sec’y 
of Health & 
Human Servs., 
462 F.3d 
1338 (Fed. Cir. 





451 F.3d 1352 
(Fed. Cir. 






1317 (Fed. Cir. 






1274 (Fed. Cir. 
2005). 
Governme
nt Affirmed Claimant no no 
Baker v. Sec’y 
of Health & 
Human Servs., 
112 F. App’x 
35 (Fed. Cir. 





104 F. App’x 
712 (Fed. Cir. Claimant Affirmed Government no no 
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368 F.3d 1378 
(Fed. Cir. 
2004). Claimant Affirmed Government no no 
Brice v. Sec’y 
of Health & 
Human Servs., 
358 F.3d 865 
(Fed. Cir. 





81 F. App’x 
333 (Fed. Cir. 





35 F. App’x 
899 (Fed. Cir. 





268 F.3d 1334 
(Fed. Cir. 





10 F. App’x Claimant Affirmed Government yes no 
54
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol12/iss1/1
[Vol. 12: 1, 2012]  
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL 
55 






7 F. App’x 966 
(Fed. Cir. 
2001). Claimant Affirmed Government no no 
Brice v. Sec’y 
of Health & 
Human Servs., 
240 F.3d 
1367 (Fed. Cir. 
2001). Claimant Affirmed Government no yes 
Goetz v. Sec’y 
of Health & 
Human Servs., 
4 F. App’x 827 
(Fed. Cir. 
2001). Claimant Affirmed Government no no 
Golub v. Sec’y 






Cir. Oct. 3, 





219 F.3d 1357 
(Fed. Cir. 
2000). Claimant Affirmed Government no no 
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Vant Erve ex 
rel. Vant Erve 






6907 (Fed. Cir. 
Apr. 18, 








2534 (Fed. Cir. 









Cir. Nov. 1, 





195 F.3d 1302 
(Fed. Cir. 
1999). Claimant Affirmed Government yes yes 
Suel v. Sec’y 
of Health & 
Human Servs., 
192 F.3d 981 
(Fed. Cir. 
Governme
nt Affirmed Claimant yes no 
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191 F.3d 1344 
(Fed. Cir. 
1999). Claimant Affirmed Government yes yes 



















Cir. May 26, 








1095 (Fed. Cir. 
Jan. 28, 1999). Claimant Affirmed Government no no 
Shyface v. 
Sec’y of 
Health & Claimant Reversed Claimant no no 
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Human Servs., 












Cir. 1998). Claimant Affirmed Government no no 
Giles v. Sec’y 






Cir. June 5, 








9410 (Fed. Cir. 
May 7, 1998). Claimant 
Reversed 
and 
Remanded Claimant no no 






545 (Fed. Cir. 
1997). Claimant Affirmed Government no no 
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Cir. May 14, 








7616 (Fed. Cir. 
Apr. 17, 





100 F.3d 929 
(Fed. Cir. 









Cir. Oct. 30, 
1996). Claimant Affirmed Government no no 
*Black v. 
Sec’y of Claimant Affirmed Government no no 
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93 F.3d 781 
(Fed. Cir. 





93 F.3d 781 
(Fed. Cir. 





88 F.3d 1001 
(Fed. Cir. 









Cir. June 12, 






1996 U.S. Claimant Affirmed Government no no 
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70 F.3d 608 
(Fed. Cir. 









Cir. Nov. 17, 










Remanded Claimant no no 
Martin ex rel. 
Martin v. 
Sec’y of 
Health & Claimant Affirmed Government no no 
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 62 
Human Servs., 
62 F.3d 1403 
(Fed. Cir. 
1995). 






254 (Fed. Cir. 





49 F.3d 1558 
(Fed. Cir. 
1995). Claimant Affirmed Government no no 
* The Black opinion was a consolidated appeal involving three cases.  To 
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